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AMERICA’S SECOND SOUTHERN BORDER?  
Mexico’s 2014 Programa Frontera Sur and the Widening of North American  
Immigration Cooperation 
 
Abstract 
 
This study seeks to answer whether Mexico’s 2014 Programa Frontera Sur (PFS) 
represents a widening of US/Mexico immigration cooperation and a shift toward what may 
become a multilateral North American immigration posture. Beginning in 2011, the US noted a 
steady increase in the number of irregular migrants arriving at the southern border after transiting 
from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador via Mexico. In response, Mexico’s President Peña 
Nieto announced Programa Frontera Sur (“The Southern Border Program”) which aimed to 
protect vulnerable migrants entering via Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala and more 
effectively enforce the physical and technological infrastructure of that border. There is 
considerable evidence that the US pressured Mexico to introduce the program early and provided 
much of its funding. This thesis outlines the purpose of PFS within the context of Mexico’s 
previous immigration policies concerning the southern border. It then analyzes the program’s 
immediate effects on immigration and migrant human rights to understand whether it met its two 
primary short-term objectives before discussing the present-day state of US/Mexican 
immigration cooperation. This thesis finds that PFS represented an unprecedented step toward 
bilateral immigration cooperation. It argues that contemporary instances of cooperation would 
not be possible without the bedrock that PFS established in 2014. It concludes that greater 
US/Mexico immigration cooperation should be expected in the future.   
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CHAPTER 1 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
“Migration is much quieter now that The Beast has been silenced,” (Sakuma, 2016).  
For decades, the infamous La Bestia1 train served as one of the many arteries guiding the 
flow of Central American migrants from the “Northern Triangle” countries of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras north through Mexico and into the United States. La Bestia is not a 
single train, but a complex network that deposited migrants at one of three areas on Mexico’s 
side of its northern border. The journey was one of the most dangerous migration routes in the 
world. Migrants, whether traveling by train or on foot along well-worn routes, are injured, 
murdered, extorted, kidnapped, raped, molested, and recruited into organized criminal groups. 
Need to contact family? Don't believe the stranger who offers their cell phone for use. It stores 
phone numbers and will later be used to extort them. For years, migrants and refugees suffered in 
silence as they made their way north toward the hope of the American dream. While in Mexico, 
however, they hardly had to conceal their intentions. Mexican authorities did not flinch.  
Beginning in 2012, rates of Central American migration through Mexico began to 
skyrocket. The number of unaccompanied minors making the journey grew even faster. The 
United States began to take note and, because Central American migrants must pass through 
Mexico to reach the States, quickly came to see Mexico’s southern border as a key player in its 
national security and immigration agendas.  
In July 2014, Mexican President Peña Nieto took the podium to announce the initiative 
that “silenced the beast” and forever altered Mexico’s immigration policy. La Programa 
                                                        
 
1 “The Beast” is also known as La tren de la muerte or “The Death Train.” 
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Frontera Sur, “the Southern Border Program” in English, was instituted with the aim of limiting 
migration from Central America, improving Mexican border infrastructure, increasing 
coordination between Mexican agencies and Central American governments, and protecting 
migrants (Wilson & Valenzuela, 2014). The plan reinforced security at twelve ports of entry and 
along well-known migration routes at Mexico’s southern border. Almost immediately, the rate of 
Central American migration to the US dropped as the rate of apprehensions in Mexico spiked. 
Specifically, during the Program’s first full year in operation apprehensions increased by 79 
percent compared to the same period in the previous year (Seelke, 2015).  
PFS was - and is - controversial. In January 2018, Amnesty International published an 
article detailing the abuses suffered by Central American migrants in Mexico in the wake of 
PFS’ installation. Their research found that 75 percent of those detained by the Instituto 
Nacional de Migración (INM) - Mexico’s immigration enforcement agency - have not been 
informed of their right to seek asylum in Mexico (Amnesty International, 2018). PFS has also 
stirred skepticism because it is unclear where it receives funding. There is considerable evidence 
that much of the program’s funding comes from the United States by way of the Mérida 
Initiative: a bilateral partnership launched in 2007 to disrupt organized crime and promote rule of 
law in Mexico. As of February 2016, the State Department had delivered an estimated $20 
million of assistance for Mexico’s southern border region. It is not known what that money is 
being specifically allocated toward (Vega, 2017). 
As the immigration debate smolders in both the US and Mexico, Immigration and 
security cooperation between the two countries is both demanded and decried by journalists and 
politicians. This project argues that PFS represented an unprecedented shift toward greater 
cooperation between the US and Mexico in regard to irregular immigration issues and should be 
understood as the point of departure for contemporary and future cooperation.      
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Research Questions and Puzzle 
Does Mexico’s 2014 Programa Frontera Sur (PFS) represent a widening of US/Mexico 
security cooperation and political shift toward a multilateral North American immigration 
policy? Immigration cooperation between states is not rare; patterns similar to that developing 
between the US and Mexico replicate themselves throughout the EU and surrounding states. 
There is evidence of a bilateral security agenda between the US and Mexico dating to the late 
1990s. However, few policies made it past what may be considered the “initiative” stage. PFS 
represents a shift in both Mexico and the US’s immigration postures. This thesis will explore 
PFS’ formation against the broader context of US/Mexico security cooperation and irregular 
migration from Central American countries. By drawing from literature on the “externalization” 
of border security and studying the underpinnings of the policy from both Mexico’s and the US’ 
perspective, this project seeks to understand the ways PFS succeeded and failed to bring both 
countries closer together in regard to immigration enforcement against transit migrants.  
What was unique about the regional context in 2014 to compel both the US and Mexico 
to seek immigration reform and shift focus south toward Mexico’s southern border? Domestic 
motives for enhanced immigration security are complex; this thesis addresses oversimplifications 
of the US/Mexico relationship and explores the motives of both states in equal measure. It argues 
that the US and Mexico’s shared complex political and social crises necessitated cooperation and 
caused PFS’s development.  
What were the immediate outcomes of the program? Did it meet its stated goals? PFS 
aimed to both disincentivize transit migration and provide greater protection to those who chose 
to transit anyway. This thesis finds that it successfully achieved only the first objective, which 
may be because it was the one that best served the strategic needs of both the US and Mexico. In 
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essence, PFS was designed and deployed in the way that most benefitted both countries. This 
sets it apart from previous policies  
Did PFS fundamentally alter the way Mexico and the US approach immigration policy 
toward a posture that emphasizes cooperation? What is to be expected moving forward? 
Analyzing instances of US/Mexico immigration cooperation since PFS’s rollout, this thesis 
argues that unprecedented and meaningful shifts have occurred. Both the US and Mexico 
currently enforce immigration policy in far more mutually beneficial ways than they did prior to 
PFS in 2014. Greater cooperation may be expected in the future as the “crisis” of NTCA transit 
migration remains a political and social threat to both countries.  
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Existing Literature on Immigration Control and the US/Mexico Relationship 
Why do states bolster domestic immigration control? What compels them to seek 
multilateral policies with neighboring states and “export” their border control regimes? The 
literature offers little insight as to which multilateral interactions - both social and political - 
triggered US/Mexico cooperation and fails to question the level(s) at which it should be pursued 
nor how it may evolve in the future. The body of literature explaining what motivates states’ 
immigration policies is varied in both type and focus. The bulk of literature may be understood 
as that which studies “unilateral” immigration enforcement (conducted by a single state within 
its own border) versus “multilateral” immigration enforcement (instituted cooperatively between 
states and across borders). Literature in the unilateral camp tends to be more robust and varied 
throughout time, while that on multilateralism is relatively limited. Both camps fail to properly 
explore the primary motivators for developing and transit states - specifically those in the 
western hemisphere - to pursue uni- and multilateral immigration policies.2 This thesis seeks to 
bolster this deficiency by studying the US/Mexico immigration relationship as one that is 
“horizontal” rather than “vertical.” This notion is meant to question the commonly-held 
assumption that either the US and Mexico enact immigration policy independent of one another 
or that the US’ downward pressure upon Mexico is the sole driver of its immigration policies. 
Using PFS as a case study offers this thesis a comparative advantage over the literature 
addressing the US/Mexico context; the bulk of such work was written well over a decade ago 
and remains speculative.  
 
                                                        
 
2 “Transit states” should be understood as states through which migrants travel from their country of origin to their 
final destination in a third country. Transit states are generally thought to be smaller, less developed states that may 
not represent a desirable destination for most migrants - both regular and irregular.  
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Drivers of Unilateral Immigration Control: 
A considerable majority of literature analyzing “unilateral” immigration control focuses 
on the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). This may be because both countries are 
hubs of academia and destinations for irregular and regular migration. Influxes in migration from 
Africa, the Middle East, Mexico, and Central America into these regions has driven empirical 
and theoretical research on immigration enforcement in recent years. The literature supports the 
hypothesis that becoming a destination for both regular and irregular migration prompts a state to 
reform immigration policies (Breunig & Luedtke, 2008). Further, structural fluctuations created 
by influxes in immigration, such as economic and labor pressures, intersect socially with other 
factors such as national history, identity, and dominant political ideology. Collectively, this 
nexus of both structural and social concerns is likely to compel a state to restrict both regular and 
irregular migration.3 The more a country is perceived an “ideal destination” for migrants, the 
more likely it is to restrict migration in the long term.  
The literature most often invokes European countries as sites to study immigration 
theory. Immigration control in the United Kingdom (UK) shifted in the 1990s from restricting 
entry from new commonwealth countries to limiting asylum-seeking from countries around the 
world (Duvell & Jordan, 2003; Lahav, 1998). Heightening globalization and shifting social and 
political priorities toward corporate welfare resulted in the UK’s current employment-visa, 
citizenship, and refugee resettlement framework, which is often regarded as one of the more 
restrictive in the EU. What’s more, patterns of increased control in a state replicate and expand 
themselves throughout closely-allied nations, specifically those in the EU (Lavenex, 2006). This 
                                                        
 
3 While there is no universally accepted definition for the term “irregular migration,” for the purposes of this thesis 
it is taken to mean attempted entry, entry, stay, and/or work in a country without proper authorization or 
documentation. It should be noted that this term was chosen over “illegal” or “undocumented” to avoid any explicit 
or implicit biases that those terms have come to carry.  
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means that, as one state begins to restrict migration and work/stay visa allocation, neighboring 
states are more likely to follow suit. Theorists assert that this shift “outward” may be an attempt 
to maximize gains from “Europeanisation” while minimizing constraints from deepening 
“supranationalism,” or the development of a broader European identity to encapsulate the 
entirety of the postwar EU (Lavenex, 2006). The shift may also be attributed Breunig & 
Luedtke’s thesis: restricting immigration in one state causes migrants to migrant to other nearby 
states, which harshen their own policies as a result. Again turning to the EU, Italy and Greece 
specifically are often blamed for their immigration policies, which are historically more laxed 
and have been deemed “inefficient” by fellow EU countries in reducing irregular migration to the 
EU (Triandafyllidou & Ambrosini, 2011; Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010). Looking south, some 
academics argue that the “EU-ization” of Turkey has recently caused it to enact restrictive 
immigration policies in an effort to grow politically and economically closer to the EU as well as 
to protect its own interests as Afghan and Syrian refugees continue to seek asylum there 
(İçduygu, 2007).  
 Theories of immigration curtailment most often applied to Europe may also be easily 
understood in the United States context. In recent decades, a marked increase in the number of 
non-English speaking, low-skilled laborers in the US has fueled increasingly conservative 
immigration policies (Rosenblum & Brick, 2011). Historically, public anxieties surrounding 
immigrants drive policy substantially more than the considerable economic advantages of 
decreased immigration restriction (Ewing, 2012; Chassamboulli & Peri, 2015). In the US, these 
public anxieties often reflect racist, anti-Mexican ideology dating back to Texas’ war for 
independence and the US/Mexican war. As they have developed, both American and Mexican 
national identities have come to define themselves in opposition to one another: increases in 
immigration into the US from Mexico challenges US identity “in a way that nothing else has in 
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the past,” (Huntington, 2000; Camarota, 2001). The relationship between the two countries 
became even more strained following the September 11 terror attacks, which immediately 
changed the US’ stance on immigration, resulting in the creation of the Department of the 
Homeland Security and the enhanced militarization of both its northern and southern borders 
(Bissett, 2003). American perceptions that Canada and Mexico did not “take the terrorist threat 
seriously enough” contributed to enhanced security measures, which persist today (Bissett, 
2003). 
Public perception is often as important, if not more so, than structural factors in 
determining the degree of a state’s immigration restrictions. The literature highlights a growing 
trend of “destination” states to pressuring allied nations to restrict immigration while 
concurrently bolstering their own policies. However, most of the literature focuses primarily on 
migration pressures faced by developed, western nations such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Research that explicitly concerns immigration control initiatives pursued by 
developing and/or countries of transit is limited. Work that specifically addresses Mexico’s 
immigration regime in a contemporary context is even more so. My research will contribute to 
the growing literature on both the US’ and Mexico’s posture toward Central American migration.  
As Contreras (2006) and Thompson (2006) argue, Mexico has increasingly attempted to 
restrict northward immigration from Central American countries; their attitude toward their own 
southern border has come to mimic that of the US. During the earliest years of Mexico’s 2014 
PFS, various universities, research institutions, and news outlets studied the root causes of the 
creation of the program and its implications for irregular immigrants. This study expands upon 
that literature by considering PFS as a genesis for a much larger, bilateral immigration agenda 
between the US and Mexico.  
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The term “Mexico’s southern border” as a scholarly reference to the site of enhanced 
border security following the 2014 influx of Central American migration through Mexico was 
coined by Wilson and Valenzuela (2014) of the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute. Their article, 
“Mexico’s Southern Border Strategy: Programa Frontera Sur” marks an early articulation of 
US/Mexico immigration cooperation by an American organization. The Wilson Center’s work 
falls into the first of two emerging camps of literature produced about Mexico’s southern border 
since 2014: objective, policy relevant analyses and human-rights focused research reports. Both 
are useful to this thesis because PFS was divided into two objectives: immigration control and 
human rights. Analyzing both allows for a more thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the 
program.   
The two most-cited articles produced within the “policy” camp are the Wilson Center 
article (2014) cited above and a report produced by Seelke, C. R. (2015) for the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) entitled “Mexico’s Recent Immigration Enforcement Efforts.” Both 
reports were written soon after the announcement of PFS and, as such, are shorter explanations 
of the goals of the policy. One commonality between both reports (and many other less-cited 
articles written during the same period) is a pervasive concern for the implications of the policy. 
Concerns surrounding human rights violations, Mexico’s weak enforcement and refugee 
processing regime, and the future of US aid to the region are all addressed in the final paragraphs 
of both reports. Reports produced during the brief window of time following the passage of PFS 
overlook many of the questions later asked by contributors to the literature and my research. This 
is partly due to the lack of information available but also speaks to roles played by organizations 
contributing to the literature; both reports are very short but remain the most-cited “bedrock” 
pieces in this conversation.  
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The second camp of literature produced regarding Mexico’s southern border in the years 
since 2014 are larger, human-rights oriented research reports written within large academic 
institutions. These reports collectively build on the foundation of knowledge established by the 
Wilson and Seelke reports and guide the collective conversation toward the humanitarian 
implications of Mexico’s southern border strategy.  
The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) have produced the most cited primary-source work on Mexico’s southern border. Isacson, 
Meyer, and Morales’ (2014) widely cited WOLA report “Mexico’s Other Border: Security, 
Migration, and the Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America” focuses on struggles 
faced by Central American migrants during their journey through Mexico. The report is one of 
the first, and certainly most cited, articulations of the “humanitarian crisis” caused by Mexico’s 
immigration policy and calls to action demanding policy change. Isacson, Meyer, and Smith’s 
(2015) follow-up delves further into the issue of non-transparency in the United States’ financial 
and logistical support for Mexico’s southern border program. The most recent primary-source 
contribution to the literature is the International Crisis Group’s (2018) report which discusses 
Central American migration and Mexico’s southern border in the context of the Trump 
presidency.  
Reports such as these ignited an incursion of news articles questioning the US’ role in 
PFS. Archibold (2014), Kahn (2014), Miroff (2014), Markon et al. (2015), Matalon (2017), 
Nolen (2017), and Whitefield & Charles (2017) wrote prominent and well-cited news pieces 
following up on the Isacson et al. (2015) report. Overall, news coverage explicitly mentioning 
Mexico’s 2014 southern border program is slim. Most US news outlets, much like the reports 
from which they pull, approach Mexico’s immigration enforcement from a humanitarian 
perspective. While little attention is given to the actual policy, the articles’ value is in their 
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ability to summarize the largest debates surrounding the US and Mexico’s policy toward Central 
American migration. In many ways, this thesis is inspired by that form. 
Ariola Vega’s (2016) Issue Brief for the Mexico Center at Rice University’s Baker 
Institute for Public Policy entitled cites the Isacson et al. (2015) piece and is one of the earliest 
reports on the subject produced by a university. Vega’s (2017) larger and much-cited follow up 
directly approaches PFS as a piece of public policy and is the first contribution to the literature 
that traces the historical and political contexts of its genesis and announcement. Like those 
before it, Vega’s work criticizes the program for making the migrant journey through Mexico 
more dangerous. Like the Baker Institute, the Mexico Security Initiative at the University of 
Texas’ Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law has produced considerable 
literature on the topic. Leutert’s (2018) policy research project report and Squires’ (2018) essay 
both cite Isacson et al. and evaluate Mexico’s migratory policies to make recommendations to 
various Mexican agencies about preserving human rights and reducing impunity. Castillo (2016) 
of the Council on Hemispheric affairs echoes this concern. 
 The literature analyzing migration from Central America through Mexico is far more 
robust than that which directly studies Mexico’s immigration policies in response to it. This is 
likely because inequality and violence is a persisting issue in Latin America and presents a much 
broader concern for international security than Mexican immigration policies. García (2006), 
Nazario (2007), Martínez (2014 and 2016), Nascimento & Hadsell (2016), and Sandoval-Garcia 
(2017) have all written seminal books that continue to bolster debates surrounding circumstances 
in Central America and the resulting migration crisis. They tend to agree that massive inequality 
and ineffective rule of law institutions in Central America have allowed organized criminal 
violence to thrive there. This violence is a primary driver of irregular migration and has not been 
effectively addressed by the international community and neoliberal reforms of the past. These 
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works, as well as my own, pull largely from studies conducted during the earliest days of large-
scale movement north from Central America. Zoldberg et al. (1986), Teitelbaum (1984), and 
Jacobsen (1996) examine the root causes, early patterns, and potential implications of Central 
American upheaval.  
 The body of work seeking to understand the causes of unilateral immigration 
enforcement policies is both wide and varied. While theoretical literature tends to focus on the 
US and EU solely as sites of complex immigration dynamics, the literature on Mexico suggests 
that transit countries experience many identical drivers of enhanced immigration enforcement as 
destination countries. The literature agrees that public perception is likely the strongest indicator 
of a country’s response to immigration and that states are increasingly looking to their neighbor 
as a source of enhanced protection from migration flows. My thesis will attempt to explore this 
pattern in a US/Mexico context and interrogate how domestic influences on immigration control 
mingle with the need to cooperate across borders in an increasingly globalized world. 
 
Border Externalization and Multilateral Immigration Enforcement 
Borders often are examined as physical demarcations of nations and impediments to 
international human migration. However, there is a growing body of literature that considers 
border control and immigration enforcement as fluid, international, and multilateral. Schain 
(2014) writes that the ability and responsibility of nations to control their borders has started to 
shift to neighboring, transit countries. Djajić & Michael (2014) pursue this thesis, considering the 
implications of cooperation in immigration control between a destination country (D) and its 
poorer neighbors (T) and to what degree the destination country should provide aid to poorer, 
transit countries for that purpose. Djajić’s (2017) follow-up concluded that strengthening border 
controls at the final destination of migrants increases the relative effectiveness of internal 
enforcement measures of the transit countries.  
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Empirical literature considering the nature of cooperation between transit and destination 
countries is scarce and limited primarily to the EU, which represents a lucrative area of study as 
its member states are so closely economically and socially tied. The literature often considers the 
“externalization” of border control onto other states through financial or social coercion. Border 
externalization, as it is understood here, seems to be a concept unique to the EU. As Casas, 
Cobarrubias, & Pickles (2010) write, the EU’s “migration routes initiative” would spread 
checkpoints and migration control to sending, transit, and destination countries. They argue that 
the “multiplication of the spaces of control and regulation” have begun to alter traditional views 
of immigration, autonomy, and EU membership. Their 2013, 2015, and 2016 articles delve 
further into the EU’s outsourcing of border control to its North African neighbor countries 
through Operation Seahorse and argue that such interactions demand a reconfiguration of the 
meaning of the term “border” as it applies to immigration. This body of work is useful because 
cases of immigration cooperation between the EU and neighboring states provide a useful metric 
against when the US/Mexico case may be compared.  
Podkul & Kysel (2015) write that externalization first occurred regionally in proximity to 
migration resulting from conflict or natural disaster. However, the increasing politicization of 
immigration policy has framed border externalization through the lens of increased 
securitization. They reference Moodley’s (2013) case study of the “pacific solution,” Australia’s 
system of offshore asylum-claim processing in Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
The Podkul & Kysel and Moodley pieces are two of the few articles within the literature that 
explicitly mention border externalization in reference to non-European countries. 
 The literature on multilateral immigration cooperation specifically in North America is 
less developed than that pertaining to Europe. Most of the literature addressing the North 
American situation was written following the September 11 terror attack and the US’s war on 
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terror, in which the US implored Canada and Mexico to cooperate in its anti-terror agenda. 
Johnson & Trujillo (2007) and Sheppard (2002) write that the war on terror triggered a wave of 
anti-terrorism cooperation between the US, Mexico, and Canada. However, as Bender (2002), 
Trujillo (2000), and Roach (2005), point out that this cooperation did little to actual improve 
regional security overall. They find that North American security cooperation coerced Mexico 
into adopting the US’s national security framework as the US simultaneously characterized 
latino/a immigrants as threats to national security. This literature echoes that written about the 
US’s unilateral immigration regime; public perception often diverges from structural and 
economic concerns regarding immigration. The literature that does consider a common North 
American policy fails to interrogate the possibility of a “North-Americanization” or 
“supranationalism” in North American countries in the same way that literature written about the 
EU does. Noble (2005) writes of “fortress North America,” a play on “fortress Europe,” which 
has come to describe the EU’s harshening immigration control policies. He finds that NAFTA 
and CUSFTA (the 1987 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement) created a “low level economic 
perimeter” around Canada, the US, and Mexico similar to that in the EU.  
 Little literature discusses contemporary North American immigration cooperation. 
Villareal & Lake (2010) of the Congressional Research Service analyze the 2005 Security and 
Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) as a coordinated response between the US, 
Canada and Mexico in response to the war on drugs and threats from Central and South 
American immigration. The SPP was intended to increase cooperation and information sharing 
but was not a signed agreement or treaty and therefore was not legally binding. Délano (2012) 
was the first to explicitly discuss a “shared responsibility” of North American nations to 
cooperate on immigration security. This work, along with that of Menjívar (2014), which 
explicitly mentions “externalizing and internalizing” North American border controls, is one of 
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the sole texts to question multilateral immigration policy in a contemporary North American 
context.  
The literature analyzing multilateral cooperation in immigration control focuses primarily 
on the “externalization” of immigration control in the EU across the Mediterranean Sea and into 
countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East that often act as transit countries for irregular 
migration. Little literature discusses North America using the same paradigm. Other researchers, 
namely Peter Andreas in his book “Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide” argue that 
US/Mexico security cooperation thrives in a counternarcotics context. He finds that this is 
because the US has been able to exert far greater pressure upon Mexico to counter drug 
smuggling than to counter mass migration – further deepening manifestations of the US War on 
Drugs in Mexican territory. Andreas describes a series of “highly visible but misleading” 
indicators of state resolve to curb migration which served anti-migrant discourse in the face of 
NAFTA negotiations but did little to actually curb migration (Andreas, 2012). The most 
substantial and broadly-cited analyses of the US/Mexico context were written in the years 
following the September 11th attacks and the US’ “war on terror.” This approach limits study of 
North American cooperative immigration policy as an “anti-terror” measure as opposed to an 
economic, strategic, and security-based one. What little contemporary literature exists is 
speculative; authors argue that US/Mexican cooperation is triggered by Central American 
migration and Mexico’s need for economic support from its Northern neighbor. Theoretical gaps 
remain between irregular migration, immigration enforcement, and political/economic strategy in 
the North American context. Choosing a specific policy as a point of study offers this research an 
advantage as compared to the literature. 
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Conclusion  
This study seeks to question assumptions that immigration cooperation between the US 
and Mexico is inherently vertical and to instead re-conceptualize it as one that has become 
increasingly cooperative since the passage of PFS. The literature on Mexican and US unilateral 
immigration reform is extensive in quantity but limited in scope; it rarely addresses reform in 
developing states or countries of transit migration. The literature on Mexico’s immigration 
regime specifically is even more limited, but useful for understanding Mexico’s motivation in 
seeking greater cooperation with the US. Increased globalization and higher patterns of irregular 
migration have motivated a wave of literature on multilateral immigration cooperation. However, 
this field is limited primarily to discussions of the EU and its neighboring states. The literature 
on North American cooperation focuses almost exclusively on security cooperation in the wake 
of 9/11. It rarely breaches cooperation in the context of immigration policy. This thesis 
synthesizes the literature to argue that PFS represents an instance of immigration cooperation 
border externalization in a North American context and a significant departure from perceptions 
of the US/Mexico relationship, which is typically conceived as purely antagonistic.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PROGRAMA FRONTERA SUR IN CONTEXT AND ITS IMMEDIATE  
EFFECTS ON MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Since the Mexican Revolution and the drafting of Mexico’s Revolutionary Constitution 
in 1917, the country has had a long and varied history of policy addressing immigration, 
refugees, and national security. Those policies that directly address Mexico’s southern border 
may be divided into two analytical categories: those intended to address security and drug 
trafficking issues and those intended to increase/restrict migration flows. While both categories 
broadly involve the physical and legislative makeup of Mexico’s southern region, they often 
manifest themselves in very different ways: efforts to combat drug trafficking often enjoy far 
greater international support and are implemented more thoroughly than those to combat 
immigration. 
Studied in context, PFS falls into the “immigration” category of Mexican security policy, 
with small aspects of it dedicated to security-based initiatives such as thwarting drug trafficking 
and criminal groups. What makes PFS unique is the degree to which it was developed in concert 
with the United States explicitly to address the crisis of unaccompanied Central American 
minors – primarily those from the ‘Northern Triangle” (NTCA) countries of Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador – transiting through Mexico to the US. While this type of bilateral 
cooperation may be observed in the “anti-drug trafficking” category of Mexican security policy, 
it is rarely observed in Mexican immigration policy until the introduction of PFS in 2014. While 
PFS was developed cooperatively, it very much belonged to Mexico and should be understood 
against the backdrop of Mexican, rather than US, security policy.  
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Although initially conceptualized as a program to disincentivize immigration into Mexico 
and to reduce human rights violations against migrants in transit, the program failed to entirely 
meet these objectives. The purpose of this chapter is to briefly explore how PFS diverged from 
previous Mexican security policies in both intent and deployment. It analyzes Mexico’s 
antecedent policies pertaining to the southern border and compares PFS to them. It then takes a 
brief look at the immediate effects of the program as it was enacted. Subsequent chapters will 
more deeply explain the binational circumstances leading up to the program and the long-term 
effects it’s had on Mexico’s migration situation, arguing that it represents a substantial shift 
toward increased US/Mexico security and immigration cooperation.  
 
Mexico’s 2014 Programa Frontera Sur 
Introduction 
 Then-Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, accompanied by Guatemalan President 
Otto Pérez Molina, announced the creation of PFS on July 7, 2014. The program had two 
primary objectives, with five key components intended to help reach those objectives. The two 
objectives were the protection of vulnerable migrants who entered Mexico without authorization 
and more effective management of ports of entry along the historically porous, 750-mile 
southern border in order to curb migration and promote prosperity and security in the region. In 
short, the program sought to disincentivize yet protect irregular migrants and to foster greater 
security and economic development in Mexico’s southern states. Very early on, the program was 
conceptualized as an economic development initiative with immigration and security-focused 
features. As the program began to take shape, it became obvious that immigration cooperation 
with the US played a much larger role in its inception than initially realized.  
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Early Indications of the Program 
The forces at work leading up to PFS’s rollout are complex and will be discussed at 
length in subsequent chapters. However, evidence suggesting that the Peña Nieto administration 
was planning an immigration initiative focused on Mexico’s southern border can be traced back 
to June of 2013, when the Secretary of the Interior, Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong, announced the 
creation of a “comprehensive development program” suited to address: 
“...the problems that arise in the more than one thousand kilometers of border with  
Guatemala and Belize, but also the option to attend and combat it, as well as to see how 
to solve the problem generated by migration,” (Peters, 2013).  
A report released by WOLA only a month before PFS’s announcement notes an increased 
presence of Mexican security forces along the southern border. To explain this, they also turn to 
the Ministry of the Interior, writing that its National Security Commission “... spoke of an effort 
to build a southern border security program with two lines of action: ‘security for development’ 
and ‘development for security,” (Isacson et. al., 2014). The report notes the lack of resources and 
training available to those working in border enforcement. 
 Other indications that a southern border program was in the works are statements from 
the Mexican National Security Council that the Peña Nieto administration planned to divide it’s 
security apparatus along the border into three “belts of control” with varying degrees of security 
and agency infrastructure. It was also suggested that the United States would be partially 
responsible for funding the program, an early indication of administrative cooperation between 
the Peña Nieto and Obama administrations that will be unpacked in coming chapters. There was 
also a meeting of delegates from the INM and their US DEA and FBI counterparts, as well as 
members of the Guatemalan National Police, along Mexico’s southern border mere months 
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before PFS’s rollout (Isacson et. al., 2014). This suggests that US and Guatemalan officials may 
have known of PFS some amount of time before it was announced.  
One article in El Universal, a major Mexican newspaper, discusses the appointment of 
Humberto Mayans Canabal as head of Coordinacion de Atencion Integral de la Migración en la 
Frontera Sur (Coordination of Comprehensive Care for Migration on the Southern Border). The 
article discusses that there is no record of his performance or even a mention of him on the 
Ministry of the Interior’s website, comparing the so-called “Migration Czar” to a ghost (Torres, 
2015) and speculating as to what the creation of his position could mean for the future of 
Mexican immigration policy. The article is reflective of much of the early speculation 
surrounding the creation of a southern border program through 2013 and 2014: Mexican security 
agencies would announce initiatives and plans before slowly backing out of them. Coordination 
between the agencies also seemed to be lacking leading up to PFS’s announcements, as some 
agencies would confirm rumors as others denied them (Isacson et. al., 2014). The buildup to PFS 
appears symptomatic of many of Mexico’s previous immigration policies; there is a lack of 
interior coordination and obvious disagreements over the purpose of the program (development, 
immigration, drug trafficking, and security seem to be used interchangeably as justification for 
the program, depending on which agency one asks.) However, there is evidence that PFS was 
intended to be a cooperative policy with the US very early on. To understand why this is, and 
how the program fits into Mexico’s broader security policy framework, outlining the central 
tenants of the program is crucial.  
 
Outline and Purpose of the Program 
 The five aspirational components of the program were as follows, Table 1 summarizes 
the framework and purpose of the program’s pillars of focus: 
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1. Regular and Ordered Migration: Improvements were to be made to the temporary work 
and visit permits for Guatemalan and Belizean migrants who travel and work in Mexico’s 
southern states. The goal of the improvements was twofold: regulating and monitoring 
movement across the border and disincentivizing illegal migration. There are two primary 
border crossing authorizations targeted by this provision. The Tarjeta de Visitante 
Regional de México (Regional Visitor Card) is valid for up to five years and allows an 
unlimited number of entries, which are limited to 72 hours each. The Tarjeta de Visitante 
Trabajador Fronterizo (Border Worker Visitor Card) grants those working in the border 
region the ability to stay for longer periods. PFS was to simplify application procedures 
and increase the number of application offices for both cards, making work and travel-
based interstate migration easier. 
2. Improvements to Infrastructure for Border Security and Migration: The twelve official 
border crossings along Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala and Belize were to be 
enhanced. Five Centros de Atención Integral al Tránsito Fronterizo (Comprehensive 
Border Crossing Attention Centers) were to be established to offer migrants access to 
medical care and provide facilities for unaccompanied migrant children awaiting 
deportation. Improvements were to be made at mobile checkpoints along Mexican roads 
leading north from the southern border. 
3. Protection of Migrants: One of the largest critiques of Mexico’s existing immigration 
enforcement regime was that it failed to guarantee the humanitarian protection of transit 
migrants and refugees. As migrants were regularly attacked and extorted by criminal 
groups and drug cartels, as well as immigration agents themselves, violence against 
migrants had negatively affected Mexico’s human rights standing internationally. To 
address this, the program required that the government coordinate with Mexican refugee 
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and immigration organizations within the private sector to improve migrant shelters and 
promote medical units to serve migrants before processing or repatriation.  
4. Regional Shared Responsibility: The program empowered Mexican security and 
immigration enforcement agencies to seek greater cooperation and coordination between 
the countries in the region, especially Guatemala, which it was already working with to 
develop strategies to dismantle regional criminal networks and create a biometric sharing 
database to track migrants exiting and entering both countries. Peña Nieto officially 
created the new Coordinating Office for Comprehensive Attention to Migration at the 
Southern Border the day after the program was announced. Led by Senator Humberto 
Mayans, the Office was charged with coordinating and managing the various agencies 
working on immigration along the southern border. Mexico also hosted the subsequent 
Regional Conference on Migration between Canada, the United States, Mexico, Belize, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic in 
an effort to play a larger role in regional migration management (Gutiérrez, 2015).  
5. Interagency Cooperation: The program was to be managed by the Secretaría de 
Gobernación (Ministry of the Interior) in coordination with the governments of Mexico’s 
four southern border States: Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Campeche and Tabasco. To this end, 
the President also announced the Coordinación para la Atención Integral de la 
Migración en la Frontera Sur (Coordinating Mechanism for Comprehensive Attention to 
Migration at the Southern Border), which was to work with the Coordinating Office for 
Comprehensive Attention to Migration at the Southern Border and relevant agencies in 
Mexico to implement the program.  
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Table 1 
Outline of Mexico’s 2014 Programa Frontera Sur  
Primary Objectives 
 
(1) Protection of Migrants in Transit through Mexico 
(2) Regular and Ordered Migration along the Southern Border 
 
Pillar/Component  Purpose 
 
Regular and Ordered Migration  
 
Improve visit/work permits; regulate 
movement, disincentivize illegal migration; 
simplify visa application procedures; increase 
number of application offices. 
 
 
Improvements to Infrastructure for Border 
Security and Migration 
 
Enhance the twelve border crossings along 
the southern border; establish border crossing 
attention centers; improve mobile 
checkpoints.  
 
 
Protection of Migrants 
 
Improve coordination with Mexican refugee 
and immigration organizations; improve 
migrant shelters; promote medical units for 
migrants. 
 
 
Regional Shared Responsibility 
 
Seek greater cooperation with other countries, 
especially the US and Guatemala; creation of 
the Coordinating Office for Comprehensive 
Attention to Migration at the Southern 
Border.  
 
 
Interagency Cooperation 
 
Improve coordination between federal and 
state agencies to implement the program, 
enforce immigration law and protect 
migrants.  
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PFS was intended to be a comprehensive program that would limit migration and 
promote greater economic development and security within Mexico’s southern border region. In 
this right, it did not diverge significantly from previous security policies meant to address issues 
along Mexico’s southern border. PFS’s uniqueness is in the fact that it was allegedly developed 
in response to a perceived immigration crisis in the United States. In order to fully understand 
the policy context in which PFS was conceptualized, and how it differs from similar programs, 
Mexico’s history of security policy must be understood. 
 
A History of Mexico’s Policies Concerning Migration and the Southern Border 
Mexico’s Early “Policy of No Policy” and Evolving Migration Context 
Historically, Mexico’s border with Guatemala and Belize has remained porous and 
unregulated. Central Americans, especially Guatemalans, have sought employment and settled 
with their families abroad in Mexico since the 19th century. Traditionally, young men from the 
region would travel seasonally to work on coffee plantations in Chiapas before paying for their 
families to join them in Mexico, where wages were often higher (Smith, 2006). Following a 
series of civil wars, regional conflicts, and communist revolutions that erupted throughout 
Central America throughout the latter years of the Cold War (late 1970s through the mid 1990s), 
much of Latin America entered the new millennium in a state of political turmoil characterized 
by encumbered economic development, gang and state-based violence, and high levels of 
economic inequality (Smith, 2006). Vocational migration was superseded by irregular migration 
(crossing into a country without necessary documentation) from Central Americans fleeing 
repressive government regimes, guerrilla warfare, urban gang violence and organized crime 
(Labrador & Renwick, 2018).  
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 Mexico soon became both a transit and destination country for Central and South 
Americans fleeing political violence in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As Marc Rosenblum 
writes, Mexico had long chosen to follow a strategy that Garcia and Griego (1988) deemed “the 
policy of no policy:” allowing Central Americans to pass into and through Mexico in hopes of 
settling in the United States (Rosenblum, 2004). When they were denied entry to the US and 
repatriated to their home countries, they often chose to instead settle in Mexico. This created a 
political problem for Mexico, which was attempting to quell the rapid and violent expansion of 
drug and narcotics syndicates amid increasing US demand for cocaine and other illegal drugs 
(Warner, 2008). As drug cartels battled for regional control of much of rural Mexico, vulnerable 
Central American migrants were recruited, extorted, raped, and often murdered while in transit. 
As Mexico’s war on drugs became increasingly violent and complex through the 1990s, whether 
the safety of Central American migrants in Mexico could be guaranteed slowly became a 
question that demanded an answer. 
Mexico itself also produced the largest share of both documented and undocumented 
immigrants in the US through the 1990s. The US soon deployed multiple operations along the 
border to criminalize Mexican labor migration and reduce the flow of people entering the US 
illegally via its southern border (“Major U.S. immigration Laws,” 2013). In addition, it began to 
pressure Mexico to enact domestic policies to reduce northbound emigration. Vicente Fox, who 
was elected President of Mexico in 2000, followed what has been called the Castañeda Doctrine 
(named for his Secretary of Foreign Affairs) which encouraged Mexican cooperation with the 
US on foreign affairs and immigration issues (Pereña, 2001). While the country passed a series 
of interior immigration policies in an attempt to limit migration into the US, it wasn’t until the 
September 11 terror attacks that migrants became seen as a direct threat to national security. The 
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US doubled down on pressuring Mexico to enact harsher immigration policies. It was during this 
time that Mexico’s modern immigration infrastructure began to take shape. 
While Mexican migratory policy’s evolution took place against a complex and varied 
context, it was dictated by a relatively small number of laws, policies, and initiatives. As the 
domestic and international situation changed, counterterrorism and antinarcotics trafficking 
became priorities. In Mexico, a clear political tension quickly emerged between regulating and 
facilitating immigration and securing the country’s borders and combatting the ongoing drug 
crisis. As such, Mexico’s immigration policies fall into two analytical categories: those 
regulating immigration and those combatting drug trafficking and organized crime. The 
following section explains those policies in both categories which were most relevant to the 
Mexican southern border.  
 
Mexican Security and Anti-Drug Trafficking Policy 
Operación Sellamiento, 1998-2000 
The goal of Operación Sellamiento, which originated from another initiative called 
Programa Sustentable de la Frontera in 1996 before being implemented in 1998, was to stem 
the flow of drugs into Mexico via land and coastal ports of entry. It involved over 22,000 agents 
from the Federal Police, military, and the Attorney’s General Office and increased the number of 
“operation bases” used to combat drug trafficking and target illegal immigration along the 
southern border (Vega, 2017). It also included the use of the “hemispheric information system” 
of satellite surveillance used to exchange intelligence with the US. The program, which is not 
referenced in any official document after 2000, was said to be a success in curbing the flow of 
illicit drugs through Mexico and “can also be used to combat other crimes that are carried out 
through the most porous border that our territory possesses,” (Castillo, 2017). The “other crimes” 
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occurring along the southern border have been speculated to be irregular immigration (Vega, 
2017). 
 
Plan de Reordenamiento de la Frontera Sur, 2006-2007  
The “Reordering Plan of the Southern Border” was proposed by President Felipe 
Calderón at the beginning of his term in December 2006. The plan intended to order migratory 
flows, improve security, combat impunity. It was drafted with input from civil society 
organizations and academics from both Mexico City and the southern border states (Canto, 
2011). Its announcement included the creation of a border police unit in the southern state 
Chiapas, as well as the reinforcement of various security measures implemented during the Fox 
administration. Some analysts argue that Calderón’s plan further subsumed border security under 
the umbrella of national security as a response to the 9/11 attacks (Donnelly, 2014). Similarly to 
Fox’s Plan Sur, Calderón’s Reordering Plan has been criticized for negatively affecting the 
Mexican stance toward Central American migrants and refugees, creating room for impunity and 
human rights abuses against them. 
 
Mérida Initiative, 2007 
 Announced in October 2007, as a cooperative effort between President Felipe Calderón 
and US President George W. Bush, the Mérida Initiative was a package of US assistance aimed 
at combatting criminal gangs, drug trafficking syndicates, and corruption in Mexico. Under the 
agreement, Mexico would head the effort to tackle crime and corruption while the US committed 
to addressing domestic drug demand and the trafficking of currency and firearms into Mexico. In 
2011, Presidents Obama and Calderón broadened the scope of the initiative to also address 
institution building, economic development, and social programs. The program is divided into 
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four “pillars:” disrupting organized criminal groups, institutionalizing rule of law and protecting 
human rights, creating a 21st century border, and building strong and resilient communities. From 
2013 to 2016, cooperation on the initiative intensified as Peña Nieto took office in Mexico. From 
FY2008 to FY2017, Congress appropriated an estimated $2.8 billion for Mexico under the 
Mérida Initiative (Seelke & Finklea, 2017). The Initiative is one of the earliest, and most 
extensive, instances of bilateral US/Mexican security cooperation.  
 
Mexican Immigration and Refugee Policy 
Mexico’s Constitution, 1917 
The 1917 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos is the country’s current 
constitution. It was drafted during the final years of the Mexican Revolution and was approved 
by the Constitutional Congress on February 5, 1917. A product of the Mexican Revolution, the 
constitution was one of the first in the world to assert that the government is obligated to 
promote the social, cultural, and economic well-being of its citizens. Article 11 of the 
Constitution outlines Mexico's earliest policy concerning immigration. Translated to English, it 
reads: 
“Everyone has the right to enter and leave the Republic, to travel through its territory and 
to change his residence without necessity of a letter of security, passport, safe-conduct or 
any other similar requirement,” (Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, 
2015). 
It continues, to read that the right to immigrate and emigrate is restricted to those who are not 
criminally or civilly liable, limited by laws regarding emigration, immigration, or public health, 
or regarded as an “undesirable alien.” Article 33 is the only one explicitly addressing foreigners. 
It guarantees them the fundamental human rights provided by the constitution but stipulates that 
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they may not “participate in the political affairs of the country,” (Political Constitution of the 
United Mexican States, 2015).  
 Through the early 20th century, Mexico competed with other North and Central 
American countries to attract primarily European immigrants in an effort to expand the 
population and modernize the economy. Similarly to the US, immigration rights were regularly 
restricted for Asian, Jewish, Middle Eastern and African migrants, who were deemed racially 
inferior and a threat to the economy. Immigration flows into the country remained relatively 
small, and immigration policies continued to fluctuate as Mexico underwent a number of 
economic and political transitions during the early years of the 20th century. During this time, a 
clear tension emerged between Mexican politician’s desire to expand the economy while 
maintaining Mexican cultural and territorial sovereignty and managing the population 
(González-Murphy & Koslowski, 2011). 
 
General Law of Population, 1974-2011  
While Mexico’s immigration laws were relatively liberal, there was a window in which 
they slowly restricted in the 1970s as population growth ceased to be a priority and Mexico 
suffered an acute economic crisis coupled with widespread unemployment rates. Mexican 
officials soon realized that it could no longer sustainably provide labor, education, and healthcare 
to its rapidly growing population (González-Murphy & Koslowski, 2011). The General Law of 
Population (GLP) effectively eliminated permanent work authorization in Mexico. By the late 
1970s, only Central American refugees qualified for immigration visas, and even they were 
restricted to those who were educated or possessed economically desirable skills. All other 
foreigners could only receive short-term visas that did not authorize them to work (Buchenau, 
2001).  
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Restrictions loosened, but the GLP is still used to regulate the population and promote 
immigration for people with economic solvency, who pose no threat to Mexican labor and show 
a desire to assimilate into the Mexican economy and culture (González-Murphy & Koslowski, 
2011). The GLP criminalized irregular migration and limited the number of legal ports of entry. 
This likely led to opportunities for corruption and human rights abuses against Central American 
migrants, who entered Mexico without documentation when legal channels failed (Leutert, 
2018). 
 
Creation of the INM, 1993 
 The Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) is the unit of Mexico’s Secretariat of the 
Interior currently responsible for controlling and supervising migration in the country. Created 
during a spike in large-scale migration from the Northern Triangle (NCTA) countries Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras, the INM was tasked with working with the UNHCR to repatriate 
refugees and deport unauthorized immigrants. It also oversaw a series of short-term work visas 
in the southern border region that allowed NTCA migrants to legally enter Mexico provided they 
remain in southern states to work (Leutert, 2018).   
 
Plan Sur, 2001-2002 
 Plan Sur (The Southern Plan) was announced on June 28, 2001. Its aim was to promote 
inter-agency cooperation strengthen surveillance and control of migratory flows along the 
southern border of Mexico. It established two belts of inspection, one from Chiapas through 
Tabasco and one from Oaxaca through Veracruz, to form containment barriers that cover the 
main northbound migratory routes (Casillas, 2002). The plan also intended to streamline migrant 
monitoring and apprehension across local, state, and national enforcement agencies using INM 
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regional offices. Guatemala implemented a similar operation, Venceremos 2001, which utilized 
similar enforcement mechanisms along its northern border with Mexico. While reports claimed 
irregular Guatemalan migration was reduced by 30%, migrants reported that the plan only forced 
them to take more dangerous routes into and through Mexico, leaving them open to extortion 
from law enforcement and drug cartels (Birson, 2010). 
The plan was organized and implemented with the support of the US, which was aiming 
to reduce the influx of Central American migrants at its own southern border. Mexican President 
Vicente Fox had recently been elected and implemented Plan Sur with the expectation that the 
US would improve the treatment of Mexican immigrants in response. However, the plan was 
announced only months before the September 11 terror attacks, after which the US would begin 
to formally view immigration as a threat to its national security. No agreement was ever reached 
(Galemba, 2015). Overall, the program unified various agencies responsible for immigration 
enforcement. However, it did little to reduce the rate of irregular migration, as NTCA migrants 
instead chose to take more dangerous routes through more rural areas of Mexico. The program 
has also been criticized for failing to address impunity and cultivating a culture that allows abuse 
against migrants in transit (Casillas, 2002). The Southern Plan was replaced in 2003 by the 
Fortalecimiento de las delegaciones regionales de la frontera sur (Strengthening the Regional 
Delegations of the Southern Border) program. However, the general strategy of increasing 
migratory stations, information sharing, and immigrant apprehensions remained (Torre-
Cantalapiedra & Yee-Quintero, 2017).  
 
Propuesta de Policía Migratoria Integral en la Frontera Sur de México, 2005 
As rates of irregular migration from NTCA countries increased, “the southern border of 
Mexico [became] a focal point of the daily work of the National Institute of Migration,” 
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(Propuesta de Política, 2005). The proposal never evolved into an actual plan, but its core 
mission was to better facilitate migration in the southern states, better protect the rights of 
migrants in the region, and update relevant legislation “according to the characteristics of 
migration populations at the southern border.” It’s included here because this design allegedly 
served as a blueprint for Felipe Calderón’s subsequent southern border initiatives (Vega, 2017).  
 
Law of Migration, 2011 
President Calderón, whose administration was under growing scrutiny from the 
international community for increasing levels of violence during the country’s war on drug 
cartels, enacted the Law of Migration in an effort to protect transit migrants passing through the 
country. Calderón said that migration “puts [migrants] in humiliating conditions, exposed to 
every kind of abuse,” (Wilkinson, 2011). The policy replaced much of the General Law of 
Population, decriminalized undocumented migration, and created a framework of procedures for 
officials working with irregular migrants in Mexico’s interior. It established the right to transit, 
medical and education services, as well as due process and the ability to document abuses against 
them. The law affirms the INM’s authority as the primary agency that oversees immigration 
policy enforcement, as well as its right to conduct “verification visits” in which agents may ask 
for immigration status and apprehend those who are in transit without documentation (Leutert, 
2018). However, it prohibits the INM from apprehending migrants in shelters or other locations 
where services are provided to them. It also promoted family unity measures and created a 
“humanitarian visa” for migrants who are a victim of a crime while in transit through Mexico 
(Nowrasteh, 2014). 
While the Law of Migration was initially regarded as a step in the right direction for the 
protection of highly vulnerable migrants, it was quickly criticized for failing to properly address 
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the issue of impunity - Mexican officials working directly with drug cartels to extort migrants 
and their families - or to provide them adequate protection from cartel violence and extortion 
(Wilkinson, 2011). 
 
PFS Versus its Antecedents 
 Mexico’s security policies throughout history have varied in scope, purpose, and 
effectiveness. Those policies diverge in intent between enhancing security, promoting economic 
immigration, and countering drug trafficking and criminal violence. PFS fits firmly in the 
“immigration” category as its core objectives were the regularization of migration and the 
protection of migrants in transit. This is not what makes its design unique. Among those policies 
that specifically concern Mexico’s southern border, PFS is one of the very few that was 
explicitly developed with international interests in mind. This kind of cooperation may be 
observed the development of the Mérida Initiative, which lies firmly in the “anti-drug 
trafficking” family of Mexican security policy. However, PFS is the sole example of Mexican 
immigration policy allegedly being conceptualized and developed bilaterally with the United 
States. Previous studies show that bilateral immigration cooperation is relatively rare between 
states with hard borders. Cooperation usually occurs almost exclusively between allied states in 
comprehensive security or economic partnerships (such as the EU).  
 As mentioned, PFS was intended to be a comprehensive program that would limit 
migration and promote greater economic development and security within Mexico’s southern 
states, which are historically underdeveloped and present high poverty rates today. Very soon 
after its announcement, the lack of administrative infrastructure and political will necessary to 
implement it fully ensured that it would never realize all of these goals. Policy experts and 
journalists have speculated that PFS’s announcement was rushed in response to pressure from 
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the United States, which would explain why it was never fully implemented. The following 
section explains how PFS both succeeded and failed to reach some of its core objectives of 
curbing irregular migration and protecting migrants in transit.  
 
PFS’s Effects on Migrant Apprehensions and Human Rights 
 PFS intended to disincentivize irregular Central American migration, reduce human 
rights abuses against those in transit, and provide greater security to Mexico’s southern border 
region. The program succeeded in reaching some of these objectives and failed to reach others. 
The purpose of this section is to explore the data regarding migrant apprehensions, deportations, 
and asylum applications, as well as the rates of human rights abuses and transit shifts endured by 
migrants before and after the program. This section intends to paint a brief picture of the migrant 
experience in transit through Mexico before versus immediately after PFS’s announcement.  
 
NTCA Migrant Apprehensions and Returns Before and After PFS  
 In the years prior to the announcement of PFS, both Mexico and the US apprehended 
relatively modest numbers of Central American irregular migrants. This is because the majority 
of immigrants into the US were from Mexico; the spike in Central American migrants wouldn’t 
appear until 2012 as criminal violence in Central American countries escalated. Notably, 
violence increased most rapidly in the NTCA countries Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, 
which also produce the majority of Central American migrants into and through Mexico. From 
2007 through 2013, Mexico apprehended an average of 78,000 Central American migrants per 
year. This figure represents irregular migrants residing in or transiting through Mexico who 
“failed to certify their immigration status,” and includes minors and asylum seekers (Extranjeros 
Presentados y Devueltos, 2019). The United States, by comparison, apprehended almost 10,000 
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less Central American migrants per year than Mexico, with an average annual apprehension rate 
close to 70,000. However, these figures are not representative of the countries’ compared 
apprehension rates over time. Starting in 2011, the number of Central Americans transiting 
through Mexico and reaching the United States increases significantly. As a result, a shift occurs 
between 2011 and 2012 and the US begins apprehending more Central American migrants than 
Mexico. The number of total apprehensions by both countries increases significantly between 
2013 and 2014 from approx. 232,000 to approx. 345,000 – a 49 percent increase that is 
representative of the large spike in Central Americans irregularly migrating to Mexico and the 
US following 2012. During the year 2014, when PFS was announced, the portion of irregular 
Central American migrants apprehended by the US and Mexico flipped, as Mexico began 
apprehending more migrants than the United States for the first time since 2011. As Figure 2.1 
shows, while the total apprehension rate was highest in 2014, at about 345,000, total 
apprehensions remained high through 2016. 
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Figure 2.1. Number of Irregular Central American migrants apprehended by Mexico and the 
United States separately and total, 2007-16.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: US Dept. of Homeland Security and Mexican Secretaría de Gobernación data. 
 
 
 
 What’s more, Mexico’s rate of assisted returns and repatriations of Central American 
migrants also spiked significantly following the implementation of PFS. As Figure 2.2 displays, 
prior to 2014, the average combined number of returns by Mexico was approximately 60,000 per 
year. In the years following the implementation of PFS, that average increased 60 percent to 
approximately 96,000 per year. Through 2014, the number of returns increased from 86,569 to 
138,927, a difference of 52,358 returns in only one year. Figure 2.2 reveals that, while Mexico 
began apprehending far more migrants than the US even as collective apprehensions increased 
dramatically, they also began returning far more of those apprehended to their origin countries in 
Central America.   
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Figure 2.2. Assisted Returns/Voluntary Repatriations of Central American Migrants by Mexico 
Before and After PFS, 2010-2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secretaría de Gobernación data. 
 
 Arguably, the sharp increase in the number of unaccompanied minors transiting through 
Mexico and to the United States ignited the political crisis which served as the exigence for PFS. 
In many ways, the purpose of PFS was to prevent unaccompanied minors from making the 
dangerous journey through rural Mexico along popular migration routes. The data of 
unaccompanied minors (UACs) apprehended and returned by the US and Mexico supports this 
theory. According to the data displayed in Figure 2.3, while Mexico maintained a steady 
increase in UAC apprehensions leading up to the announcement of PFS, with an average annual 
apprehension rate of 7,214 UACs, the US’s apprehension rate sharply declined by 42 percent 
through 2014, from 68,631 to 40,035. Between 2016 and 2017, the rates of apprehension 
decreased for both countries, which may be attributed to the decrease in incentive to migrate 
following the implementation of PFS and enhancement of Mexican southern border security. 
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Figure 2.4 offers another interpretation of this data, as it displays the portion of UACs 
apprehended by both countries out of the total.  
 
Figure 2.3. Unaccompanied children apprehended by the US and Mexico before and after 
Programa Frontera Sur, 2012-2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secretaría de Gobernación and US Department of Homeland Security data.  
 
 
 
 
As the Figure 2.4 shows, between 2014 and 2015, the portion apprehended by Mexico 
increased considerably and remained high through 2017, when the most recent data for both 
countries is available. 
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Figure 2.4. Portion of Unaccompanied Children Apprehended by the US and Mexico before and 
after Programa Frontera Sur, 2012-2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secretaría de Gobernación and US Department of Homeland Security.  
 
 In respect to UACs returned to their home country, the data available supports the thesis 
that Mexico played a much more substantial role in curbing Central American migration 
following the implementation of PFS. As Figure 2.5 indicates, prior to the program, Mexico 
returned an average of 5,770 UACs annually between 2010 and 2013. Following the program, 
that number skyrocketed to 27,027 annual returns between 2014 and 2018. Between 2013 and 
2014, the number of returns increased by 110 percent from 8,563 to 18,003 returns. The next 
year, it again increased by 103 percent from 18,003 returns in 2014 to 36,600 returns in 2015. 
This data shows that, following PFS, Mexico began both apprehending and repatriating increased 
amounts of UACs.  
 
PFS Announced 
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Figure 2.5. Central American Migrant Minors (Under 18) returned by Mexico to their country of 
origin before and after PFS, 2010-2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
- The program was supposed to do one thing, it did another 
- The next chapter will dig into the exigence of the program and the bilateral intentions 
behind it.  
 
 
Source: Secretaría de Gobernación data. 
 
 Using data compiled from Mexico’s Secretaría de Gobernación and the US Department 
of Homeland Security, there is a substantial shift in both countries’ rates of apprehensions and 
deportations of Central Americans, especially unaccompanied minors. In the year PFS was 
enacted, Mexico began apprehending far more Central Americans than it had prior to 2014. 
Mexico’s rate of migrant returns increased even more substantially. These shifts indicate that, 
while there was increased Central American migration starting in 2012, Mexico also took on an 
elevated role in apprehending and returning migrants while the US enjoyed decreased rates of 
apprehensions and deportations during the same period. This further complicates the question of 
whether PFS was deployed early due to pressure from the US during a political crisis 
surrounding UACs arriving at the US/Mexico border. This possibility will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3.  
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Human Rights Abuses and Migration Routes Before and After PFS  
 While it is relatively simple to compare the data of Central American migrant 
apprehensions and deportations for the US and Mexico before and after the announcement of 
PFS, it is far more difficult to draw conclusions about the effects PFS had on the safety of the 
migrants. As protecting migrants was a core objective of PFS, alongside ordering and restricting 
migration, it is necessary to briefly explain the effect PFS had on migrant human rights. This 
section shows that, while PFS provides the framework for cooperation in migrant apprehension 
and deportation, the provisions aimed at protecting migrant rights have lagged behind.  
 Groupos Beta is a section of Mexico’s INM that works in coordination with NGOs and 
human rights organizations to offer information, medical services, and water to migrants at risk 
in Mexico. Mexico’s Secretaría de Gobernación (Secretariat of Governance) maintains a 
database documenting actions undertaken in the service of migrants on an annual basis. While 
the data is hardly representative of the entire migrant human rights situation in Mexico, it offers 
insight into actions undertaken by the Mexican government to guarantee migrant protections in 
the years before and after PFS’s announcement. The majority of migrant data recorded by 
Groupos Beta falls into three interactions: migrants rescued, migrants receiving human right and 
physical guidance, and migrants receiving social assistance. Surveying available data, it quickly 
becomes obvious that little statistical incline occurred in any of the three categories of migrant 
assistance before versus after the introduction of PFS.  
 “Migrants rescued” refers to migrants who were removed from a “situation or state of 
risk” regardless of the type of assistance or guidance provided, according to the Secretariat of 
Governance (Groupos de Protección a Migrantes, 2019). The “rescue” could occur in any 
scenario and in both urban and rural environments. As Figure 2.6 shows, the number of migrant 
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rescues decreased by 57 percent, from 6,342 to 2,710 annual rescues, from 2013 to 2014. After 
the announcement of PFS, rescues increased slightly from 2,710 rescues in 2014 to 3,438 rescues 
in 2015 and 4,990 in 2016, before tapering down again.  
 
Figure 2.6. Migrants rescued by Groupo Beta while in transit through Mexico, 2010-2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secretaría de Gobernación data. 
  
 The data regarding migrants receiving physical risk and human rights guidance while in 
transit through Mexico tells a very similar story. Guidance, in the form of an “orientation” is 
provided verbally and/or with a triptych, and is administered to migrants regardless of their 
nationality or immigration status (Groupos de Protección a Migrantes, 2019). The annual number 
of migrants receiving guidance began to steadily decrease from 323,604 in 2012. As PFS was 
announced in 2014, the rate continued to decrease from 283,473 in 2013 to 210,094 in 2014, and 
again to 193,633 in 2015. The annual rate of guidance remains steady through 2018. These 
trends are reflected in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7. Migrants receiving physical risk, human rights guidance while in transit through 
Mexico, 2010-2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secretaría de Gobernación data. 
 
 
 Figure 2.8 displays the data recorded for migrants receiving social assistance by Groupos 
Beta. The trends for this data are very similar to those in Figure 2.7. There is a notable decrease 
in the number of migrants given social assistance, which includes food, shelter, minor medical 
care, transfers to hospitals and/or counseling, from 2012 through 2018. Specifically, the number 
of migrants given assistance in 2013 was 256,116. In 2014, this rate decreased by 81,488 to 
174,628. It decreased by another 25,543 in 2015. The introduction of PFS in 2014 seems to make 
little difference in the annual number of migrants assisted through 2018.  
 
 
 
 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
N
um
be
r o
f M
ig
ra
nt
s
Year
PFS Announced 
(July 2014) 
 
 
51 
Figure 2.8. Migrants receiving social assistance while in transit through Mexico, 2010-2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secretaría de Gobernación data. 
 
 As previously discussed, the data provided by the Mexican government is only a small 
part of the much broader picture of migrant human rights while in transit through the country. 
Gang violence, corruption, forced movement from common routes, human trafficking, and 
domestic violence are all important factors influencing migration. However, given the nature of 
PFS as a Mexican government program that aspired to improve the well-being of irregular 
migrants in Mexico, exploring the Mexican government’s reported data offers valuable insight. 
Across the largest variables recorded: migrants rescued, migrants receiving human rights 
guidance, and migrants receiving social assistance, there seems to be a general decrease as PFS 
is introduced in 2014. As one of PFS’s core objectives was to improve migrant safety, one may 
have reasonably expected each of these variables to have increased as greater numbers of 
migrants were served by Groupos Beta.  
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 Qualitatively, PFS is said to have made the migrant journey through Mexico substantially 
more dangerous than it was before. By more rigidly enforcing Mexican ports of entry and 
highways, as well as forcing migrants to stop riding La Bestia trains north through the dense 
Mexican jungle, PFS shifted popular migration routes into unfamiliar territory, leaving migrants 
increasingly vulnerable to criminal violence, extortion, sexual assault and murder (Martínez, 
2018). Mexico’s war on drug cartels has only worsened violence against migrants. The 
diversification and fragmentation of cartels has increased competition for territory, membership, 
and finances. In the complex conflict between powerful criminal groups and the Mexican state, 
the well-being of NTCA migrants was rarely a consideration in the years following PFS’s 
announcement.  
 
Conclusion 
 PFS’s development was unique for a number of reasons. Most notably, it represented a 
new standard of bilateral cooperation with the United States on immigration policy whereas 
cooperation had usually only occurred on security and counter-narcotics strategies. It is believed 
that this cooperation developed in response to an influx of unaccompanied minors reaching the 
US from Central America via Mexico. Chapter 3 will unpack this notion and better explore the 
motivations of both states in enacting the program.  
While PFS did contain explicit security provisions, its two primary goals were to regulate 
and prevent increased migration across the southern border and to protect migrants in transit. 
Following the announcement of the program, Mexico began apprehending and deporting far 
more irregular Central American migrants than it had before, even surpassing the US in migrant 
apprehensions and matching the US in UAC apprehensions. Given that the US has a 
substantially more comprehensive immigration and border infrastructure than Mexico, the 
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increased role Mexico assumed in immigration issues is remarkable. From a data-driven 
perspective, PFS succeeded in increasing Mexico’s role in regulating and disincentivizing 
migration. This question will be explored more thoroughly in Chapter 4.  
While PFS seems to have increased Mexico’s role in apprehending and deporting Central 
American migrants, can the same be said for guaranteeing their human rights? While the 
available data paints a broken picture of the challenges faced by migrants in Mexico, it appears 
not. After the announcement of PFS, little change occurred in the annual rates of migrants 
provided human rights information, social services, or rescue by Groupos Beta. PFS also forced 
migrants off of familiar trails and made their journey both slower and substantially more 
dangerous.  
 In sum, it appears that PFS succeeded in enforcing apprehension and deportation policies 
but failed to better guarantee the human rights of Central American migrants as they transit 
through Mexico. In order to better understand why this discrepancy occurred, Chapter 3 outlines 
both the United States’ and Mexico’s motivations for pushing the program and their intentions 
for it following its announcement. By better understanding the foundations of the program, 
Chapter 4 better enumerates the ways PFS failed and succeeded to meet its objectives and how it 
may be considered the linchpin for contemporary bilateral security cooperation between the US 
and Mexico.  
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CHAPTER 3 
US AND MEXICAN INTERESTS IN DEVELOPING PROGRAMA FRONTERA SUR 
 
 The Central American Countries Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador are some of the 
most violent in the world, with the highest homicide and crime rates in the Western Hemisphere. 
In the years prior to 2014, this violence became the central driver of mass migration north. Both 
the United States and Mexico were politically and logistically unprepared to handle such a 
staggering increase in migrants arriving at their respective borders. This chapter seeks to build 
upon the contents of Chapter 2 – which explains the conception and immediate effects of PFS – 
by unpacking both the US and Mexico’s motivations in developing PFS. The purpose of this 
chapter is to show that PFS was not random, and that the US and Mexico had quite different 
reasons for developing it. It also seeks to better understand the priorities that caused PFS to be 
more effective in apprehending and disrupting migrants in transit than in guaranteeing their 
human rights, as Chapter 2 explained. 
 
UACs and Political Crisis in the United States 
NTCA Migrants at the US Southern Border 
 Beginning in 2011, the US Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) Division noted a steady increase in the number of “unaccompanied Alien 
Children” (UACs) and “family units” arriving at the southern border of the United States after 
transiting from the “Northern Triangle” (NTCA) countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador. UACs are defined as minors under the age of 18 who reach the border without a parent 
or authority figure. Family units are defined as more than one member(s) of a family arriving at 
the border together. Specifically, the number of UACs from NTCA countries encountered by 
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CBP rose from 20,805 in FY2013 to 51,705 in FY2014, a nearly 149 percent increase in one 
year. Figure 3.1 shows the amount of Guatemalan, Honduran, and El Salvadoran UACs 
encountered by CBP at the US southern border between fiscal years 2009 and 2014. CBP did not 
begin collecting data regarding family units apprehended along the southern border until FY 
2013. However, the data available indicates a similar trend. Along the US southern border, the 
number of family units apprehended jumped 361 percent between 2013 and 2014, from 14,855 to 
68,445 individuals. 
 
Figure 3.1. NTCA UAC migrants encountered by CBP along the US southern border, by country 
of origin, 2009-2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: US Department of Homeland Security data. 
 
UACs and family units aside, the overall number of Central Americans apprehended at 
the southern border via Mexico continued to rise in the years prior to 2014, as was discussed in 
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Chapter 2. As these number spiked, the number of Mexican migrants apprehended at the US 
southern border slowly declined in comparison until Central Americans represented the largest 
community seeking to migrate or gain asylum in the United States. According to CBP data, 
many of them succeeded. From FY 2005 to FY 2015, the estimated number of NTCA migrants 
residing in the US without documentation rose from 1,020,000 to 1,810,000, a 77 percent 
increase. As Figure 3.2 shows, the estimated NTCA unauthorized population residing in the US 
without documentation has increased steadily since 1990, with Salvadorans consistently ranking 
highest, followed by Guatemalans and Hondurans.  
 
Figure 3.2. Estimated NTCA migrants residing in the US without documentation, 1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: US Department of Homeland Security data.    
 
The vast majority of NTCA migrants apprehended at the US border arrived at the “Rio 
Grande Valley” sector port of entry, which covers the southern tip and coast of Texas. Experts 
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argue that this entry is preferable because if its proximity to the Central American isthmus and 
less difficult terrain than transiting through the western half of Mexico. It is believed that 
migrants chose to make the dangerous journey through Mexico due to perceptions that the US 
had generous treatment of children arriving at the border, better family reunification policies for 
those who have relatives residing in the country, and generally better economic opportunities. 
They weren’t entirely wrong: The Bush administration passed a law called “Operation 
Streamline” in 2005 requiring that children who migrated to the US (and were not from Mexico 
or Canada) be given the opportunity to appear at an immigration hearing and access to legal 
counsel as they underwent the immigration or asylum process (Lydgate, 2010). Some policy 
analysts argue that the law may have helped motivate migrants to make the long journey to the 
US (Hulse, 2014). However, while the US does have a far more expansive immigration and 
refugee processing infrastructure than Mexico, there is considerably more evidence that push 
factors from Central America drove migration far more than perceptions that the US offered 
better protections to migrants. As WOLA analysts write, NTCA asylum claims increased 
substantially all over the region in the years leading to 2014. Specifically, Mexico, Panama, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Belize jointly observed a 712 percent increase in asylum applications 
from NTCA countries (WOLA, 2014).  
 
The Resulting Political Crisis 
 The sheer number of Central Americans, especially NTCA unaccompanied minors, 
arriving at the border was unlike anything the US had encountered previously. While overall 
migration had been steadily decreasing since the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security and enhanced securitization of the US southern border, the US was simply unable to 
accommodate the number of children and family units arriving and seeking asylum at ports of 
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entry. Legally, US border patrol agents could not turn away any migrant who said they had 
credible fear that they would be harmed if deported to their origin countries and requested 
asylum (Lind, 2014). Because most unaccompanied children from NTCA countries did not 
attempt to sneak over the border but instead turned themselves in to the border patrol at ports of 
entry, small border patrol stations in rural areas of Texas were quickly overwhelmed in the early 
months of 2014.  
 As the influx continued to grow, temporary detention facilities were constructed along 
the southern border to help house and process child asylum and family reunification applicants. 
While held in detention, migrants were given access to medical and social services as they 
attended their immigration hearings in an attempt to win refuge in the US. While the centers 
were constructed to hold migrants for no more than a few weeks, many migrants were forced to 
stay for much longer. As more migrants arrived than could be held or legally represented, many 
had to defend themselves in court alone. One center, in Dilley, Texas, pictured in Figure 3.3, was 
constructed on a 50-acre plot of land and could house up to 2,400 migrants. The average age of 
children in the Dilley compound, which housed both families and UACs, was nine years old 
(Preston, 2015). For the Obama administration, which had recently won re-election in 2012, the 
detention centers served a dual purpose. While serving as holding center for migrants undergoing 
legal processing, centers were also meant to serve as a deterrent to migrants traveling to the US 
under the assumption that children received special treatment there. Obama also directed 
immigration judges to refuse bond for migrants as a potential deterrent (Preston, 2015). 
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Figure 3.3. Arial view of the “South Texas Family Residential Center” in Dilley, Texas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Google Maps, March 2019.  
 
Journalists were soon granted access to the detention camps in Texas and Arizona. They 
reported that migrants in the centers, while kept safe and in relatively good condition, were still 
deeply traumatized by their experiences and forced to live in prison-like conditions for extended 
periods of time while their files were processed (Preston, 2015). The resulting media coverage 
and political backlash against the Obama administration was widespread and aggressive. Very 
quickly, a situation that the US government was ill-equipped to handle devolved into a full-scale 
political meltdown. As Central American UACs continued to arrive, the Obama administration 
increased long-term foster care opportunities, hired more immigration lawyers to represent 
migrant families, and funded an advertising campaign (along with giving speeches) in NTCA 
countries warning of the dangers of migrating to the US (Office of the Vice President, 2014).  
 In spite of the administration’s efforts, conditions in detention centers remained dismal 
and pressure began to mount from both sides of the aisle for Obama to take further action. In 
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general, the left argued that push factors, such as violence in NTCA countries, were drivers of 
the mass migration and that NTCA migrants should be considered refugees and offered some 
type of asylum. Those on the right argued that pull factors, such as the US’s “weak” immigration 
policies, incentivized migration and should be tightened and more heavily enforced. Specifically, 
Republican Congressional leadership took the crisis as an opportunity to blame the Obama 
administration’s 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program – which 
extended protection from deportation and access to education to some young unauthorized 
immigrants in the US – for motivating young NTCA migrants to embark to the US (Lind, 2014). 
The Republican controlled House of Representatives passed multiple bills terminating DACA as 
well as the law restricting expedited removals of non-Mexican and non-Canadian children. 
Conversely, the Democratically controlled Senate passed measures to hire more immigration 
judges and longer-term care for UACs. Partisan gridlock ensured that congressional action was 
never taken as further blame fell upon the Obama administration (Lind, 2014).  
 By early 2014, the situation at the border had become dire. The Obama administration 
insisted that DACA was not to blame and requested on July 8 that Congress allocate $3.7 billion 
in emergency finds to reinforce border security, streamline migrant processing and address the 
humanitarian situation in Central America (Park 2014). After this request failed, Obama pivoted 
to a more intense tone, promising that the US would begin moving quickly to repatriate as many 
Central American migrants as possible to their countries of origin. He also began pushing 
congress to undo the Bush-era law that required NTCA children apprehended in the US to be 
handed over to the Department of Health and Human Services, which then oversaw their medical 
care and housing as their cases were processed (Voorhees, 2014). This shift in policy intended to 
further disincentivize transit migration. The political left in Congress, who faced a midterm 
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election that November, blamed Obama for failing to grant children refugee status and not 
working hard enough to unite broken migrant families.  
 Faced with bipartisan backlash and an entirely stalled Homeland Security Department, 
the Obama administration doubled down on pressuring the Peña Nieto administration to take 
more comprehensive action to prevent migrants from making the journey through Mexico into 
the United States. One large motivator for this pressure was the public outrage from the US at the 
extremely dangerous journey UACs had to make in order to make it to the US. Books such as 
Sonia Nazario’s “Enrique’s Journey” and Óscar Martínez’s “The Beast: Riding the Rails and 
Dodging Narcos on the Migrant Trail” introduced Americans to the often-lethal ride north upon 
the La Bestia (the Beast) train through Mexico. As will be discussed further in this chapter, 
migrants in transit are subject to human trafficking, abduction, extortion and very often murder 
(Martínez, 2014). The telling of their stories outraged Americans and further incentivized Obama 
to pressure the Mexican administration into preventing transit migration (Silver, 2013).  
 Peña Nieto was no stranger to working with the United States on security issues. As was 
touched upon on Chapter 2, the Mérida Initiative laid the groundwork for a bipartisan approach 
to the issues greatest affecting domestic security in the US and Mexico. Launched in March 
2007, the Mérida partnership was initially between Presidents Felipe Calderón and George W. 
Bush. It was the first large-scale package of US assistance given to Mexico explicitly for tackling 
the drug-trafficking related violence that had crippled Mexico’s government, economy, and 
society. Starting in 2013, Mérida cooperation intensified when President Peña Nieto took office, 
the focus of the program shifted from institution building toward justice sector reforms, 
countering corruption at the state and local level, border security, and anti-money laundering 
efforts. In FY2013, an estimated $222.2 million was appropriated to Mexico by Congress under 
the Mérida Initiative (Seelke & Finklea, 2017). 
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 Because the Mérida Initiative was a security agreement and the money allocated within it 
was explicitly earmarked for certain projects and initiatives, it could not be used by the US to 
stem the flow of migrants within Mexico. However, there is considerable evidence that the 
existence of the Mérida Initiative provided the impetus and a “roadmap” of sorts for the 
formulation of PFS. On June 19, 2014, less than one month before the announcement of PFS, 
Presidents Obama and Peña Nieto spoke by phone to discuss a “regional strategy to address the 
influx of unaccompanied children coming from Central America, through Mexico…” and to 
discuss both countries’ responsibility to promote security in the region (“Readout”, 2014). On 
the call, Obama emphasized collaboration on the development of “concrete proposals” to address 
the root causes of NTCA migration. The following day, June 20, US Vice President Joe Biden 
gave remarks about the Central American immigration crisis in Guatemala City, Guatemala. In 
his speech, he remarked on the importance of shared responsibility between Mexico, the US, and 
Central American countries in stemming migration and ensuring greater security in NTCA 
countries, referring to the crisis as “a tragedy we all must take responsibility for,” (White House, 
2014).  
 As mentioned, President Peña Nieto announced PFS only two weeks after talking with 
President Obama about a bilateral solution to the crisis. The following January, Obama 
personally thanked Peña Nieto for working to address the flow of UACs through Mexico. He 
went on, saying “In part because of strong efforts by Mexico, including at its southern border, 
we’ve seen those numbers [of apprehensions] reduced back to much more manageable levels,” 
(Hudson, 2015). As discussed, PFS was “owned” entirely by Mexico, and was not the same sort 
of partnership displayed by the Mérida Initiative. However, there is considerable evidence that 
the political crisis in the US, and the diplomatic pressure the US exerted upon Peña Nieto, played 
a major role in the early rollout and implementation of PFS. Some analysists have argued that 
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PFS was in the works prior to the US migrant “crisis” and was projected to be announced much 
later than mid-2014, and that it was unveiled solely as a response to US pressure (Vega, 2017). 
The hasty assembly and early rollout may be two reasons that PFS failed to fully realize its 
mission, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. There is also evidence that, while indirectly, 
Mexico received financial assistance for the implementation of PFS through “pillar 3” (“Create a 
21st-Centry Border”) of the Mérida Initiative (Gertz, 2013). Prior to PFS, most of that border aid 
went to Mexico’s norther border zone. However, some of that aid allegedly slowly drifted south 
in the months before PFS was announced (Isacson et. al., 2014). 
 While the US played a major role in the genesis and political pressure motivating PFS, it 
would be incorrect to characterize it as purely “America’s program” that Mexico simply drove. 
In the months leading to PFS, President Peña Nieto was facing a political crisis of his own, and 
the program was reflective of his broader vision for a Mexico more engaged in international 
politics. To fully understand how PFS came about, outlining Mexico’s social and political 
motivations for the program is vital. 
 
Central American Violence and Mexico’s Response to Transit Migration 
 Influxes in Central American transit migration strained the US and Mexico, both 
logistically and politically. While the US’s political crisis occurred primarily as a result of public 
outcry and partisan competition, Mexico’s was much more a result of economic shifts and 
international pressure to better guarantee human rights. As will be discussed, violence in Central 
America was the main push-factor in migration. As Mexico’s was on drugs waged on and 
increasing migrants continued to pour into the country, President Peña Nieto had to balance his 
security priorities with the need to protect migrants on their extremely dangerous journey. The 
purpose of this section is to better understand the nature of the violence driving Central 
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American transit migration, as well as the factors underlying Mexico’s response to it. Previous 
research fails to properly account for the complex political and social forces motivating Peña 
Nieto’s response, as well as how it compared to that of the US prior to PFS. This section aims to 
discuss these aspects of PFS’s formation more thoroughly and to show that the drivers of its 
development indicate a meaningful shift in the US’s and Mexico’s immigration policies toward 
greater cooperation in regard to NTCA migration deterrence.  
 
Violence in Central America  
 As the Council on Foreign Relations writes, violence in Central American countries, not 
the economic promise of living in the United States, is the primary driver of northward migration 
from NTCA countries (Lobrador & Renwick, 2018). Rocked by decades of civil conflict and 
Cold War political manipulation from the US throughout the 1980s, the region entered the 2010s 
plagued by ineffective governance, widening social and economic inequality, deepening poverty, 
weakened security and growing gang violence (Eguizábal et. al., 2015). These issues have 
rendered the Northern Triangle countries some of the most dangerous in the world. Since 2000, 
each of the countries had steadily increasing rates of homicide. In 2012, two years before the 
introduction of PFS, Guatemala’s homicide rate per 100,000 people was 39.9, El Salvador’s was 
41.2, and Honduras’s was a shocking 90.4. One city in Honduras, San Pedro Sula, recorded the 
highest rate of homicide for a “non-war setting” in 2013 (Eguizábal et. al., 2015). Figure 3.4 
shows the homicide rates for the NTCA region as compared to that of Mexico, which is 
popularly, and incorrectly, characterized by some Americans as a hub of violence in the region.  
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Figure 3.4. Homicide rates per 100,000 people in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras, 2000 – 2012.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) data. 
 
Central America’s position as a transit region for South American northward drug 
trafficking further exacerbates the security issues mentioned above. In the mid 2000s, the amount 
of cocaine seized in Central American countries grew larger than that seized in Mexico. By 2011 
the volume of cocaine intercepted in transit in Central America was over 13 times that seized in 
Mexico (UNODC, 2012). According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in 2012 report, 
cocaine trafficking is the “paramount crime issue,” and the groups who profit from it were 
partially responsible for the escalating violence in the region. The massive amount of cocaine 
transited through the region, combined with the NTCA governments’ inability to ensure security, 
inflamed conflict between drug trafficking syndicates and urban street gangs. Civilians are often 
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recruited, extorted, robbed, or even murdered in a complex chess game to control an extremely 
volatile industry.  
Deeply affected by corruption and struggling economies, the governments of NTCA 
countries had extreme difficulty responding to drug trafficking throughout the 2000s. In an 
attempt to quell the violence, some countries deployed campaigns of intense repression and 
extensive policing of urban, gang-controlled areas. Most notably, El Salvador’s “La Mano 
Dura,” or “the firm hand” policies have become emblematic of this type of response. 
Implemented in 2003, Mano Dura policies initially reduced the crime rate in the country. 
However, the rates of incarceration and corruption skyrocketed as the military was given 
extensive control of civilian policing. In the first year of the program, over 20,000 people were 
arrested for suspected criminal activity; over 91 percent of them were later released (Hume, 
2007). While militarized solutions typically enjoy widespread public support, they often 
transform prisons into overcrowded “gang recruiting centers” and fail to reduce the overall crime 
or drug trafficking rates (Shifter, 2012).  
Femicide, defined as a crime involving the deliberate and gender-motivated killing of a 
woman, has also been one of the major categories of violence affecting Central America, 
especially NTCA countries. According to UN Women, in 2012, 647 women were murdered in El 
Salvador (which had the highest murder rate of women in the world) and 375 in Guatemala. 
Femicide crimes are often extremely difficult to prosecute; Honduras’ rate of impunity for 
femicide crimes was an estimated 77 percent the same year (Wilson, 2014). Femicide often 
occurs to mothers with children, who are left traumatized by the event and may be forced to 
migrate north as a result.  
All of these factors: extreme gang and drug violence, ineffective institutions, impunity for 
crimes and pervasive violence against women – were the causes of the large waves of irregular 
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Central American migrants and UACs beginning in the 2010s. For families and young people 
living in NTCA countries, fleeing north and hoping to reconnect with a relative in Mexico or the 
US was often the only alternative to sexual assault, murder, or recruitment into maras (urban 
gangs) (Tuckman, 2014). Understanding this pervasive violence is useful because it provides 
valuable context to the problems faced by the US and Mexico in containing the influx of 
irregular NTCA migrants and refugees. These difficulties, explained below, provided the 
exigence for PFS and revealed the advantage of immigration policy cooperation to the US and 
Mexico.  
 
Mexico as a Country of Transit and Destination  
 The irregular migrant’s journey northward through Mexico was one of the most 
dangerous in the world. For migrants hoping to travel through Mexico, a journey of anywhere 
between 2,000 and 3,000 miles, the primary options of transit were by foot or via freight train 
until they could reach Mexico’s northern states. Crossing the border was simply a matter of 
walking over it or crossing a river near official checkpoints. Immediately upon entering Mexico, 
however, migrants became vulnerable to apprehension, extortion, and violence. Chiapas, 
Mexico’s southernmost state and most NTCA migrant’s first introduction to the country, ranked 
second in number of registered human trafficking cases in Mexico between 2010 and 2013 
(Isacson et. al., 2014). Women and minors migrating through this area were commonly pressured 
into sex work and prostitution, either by force or as a means to save money for the journey north. 
Many were lured into the industry with promises of well-paying jobs in hotels or restaurants. 
This practice is a sort of “open secret” that was generally ignored by local authorities. Violence, 
sexual assault, and murder were common and went unreported by migrants, who feared 
deportation (Moloney, 2017).  
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 Moving north along familiar migration routes, NTCA migrants who could afford to hire 
smugglers to take them north did so. Most, however, were forced to climb aboard La Bestia 
(“The Beast”): massive, quick-moving freight trains that circulated Mexico’s countryside en 
route to the northern states. If they survived the climb aboard the moving train, migrants then had 
to evade gangs and robbers while avoiding the nearly always-fatal fall onto the tracks below 
(Archibold, 2013). Those who made the journey on foot were at constant risk of extortion, 
kidnapping, and murder from regional criminal groups and drug traffickers, which maintained 
control of much of Mexico’s interior. Starvation, dehydration, and sexual assault were also 
common along the migrant trails. In rural parts of Mexico, many police and immigration officials 
worked directly with drug cartels to kidnap or extort migrants in transit. If migrants reached the 
northern states of Mexico, they then had to pay a smuggler or coyote to guide them through the 
grueling Sonora Desert and across the Rio Grande into the US. Those who could not afford the 
services of coyotes risked making the final part of the trip alone. Many died of starvation and 
dehydration or were apprehended by CBP in the final hours of their journeys (Martínez, 2014).  
 Mexico had served as a transit country for Central Americans seeking refuge in the US 
since the 1980s. However, against the backdrop of increasing transit migration and criminal 
violence, Mexico’s economy had been steadily improving. From 2010 to 2014, Mexico’s GDP 
grew 24 percent, from $1.057 trillion to its all-time high of $1.314 trillion USD (Looney, 2019). 
As Mexico’s economy grew and the international business community began investing heavily in 
its industries, it quickly became economically feasible for Central American migrants to work 
throughout the country as laborers. Mexico City’s rapid industrial expansion particularly 
represented a desirable destination for many migrants (Cave, 2013). From 2011 through 2014, 
Mexico slowly transformed from a transit to a destination country for many NTCA migrants.  
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 In 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto was elected to the Presidency of Mexico with a campaign 
focused heavily on the economic development and securitization of Mexico. For Peña Nieto, this 
meant that increasing cooperation with fellow NAFTA signatories the US and Canada on issues 
such as trade, energy, manufacturing, and security was a necessity (Rotella, 2012). In his earliest 
years as president, Peña Nieto expanded Mexico’s number of free trade agreements to include 
over 40 countries and helped secure the growth of the Mexican middle and upper classes to 
include 95 percent of the country. He also mobilized quickly to work with US President Obama 
to secure greater rights for Mexican immigrants residing in the US, granted a political advantage 
as Mexican immigration into the US had recently reached net-zero (O’Neil, 2013).  
Most notably, Peña Nieto further blurred the lines between the Mexican military and interior 
law enforcement in a failed effort to curb the growing power of drug trafficking cartels 
throughout the country (O’Neil, 2013). While he managed to plateau cartel violence, the overall 
rates of violence remained extremely high. This violence, as well as the state’s excessively-
militarized response to it, implicated Mexico in widespread civilian deaths and human rights 
abuses. In a 2013 report released by Human Rights Watch, analysts write that Mexican security 
forced had committed widespread human rights violations, including killings, forced 
disappearances, and torture, in an effort to stem cartel influence. Central American migrants 
often suffered disproportionately in the crossfire (World Report, 2013).  
As his presidency entered its third year, Peña Nieto’s human rights record continued to suffer 
as allegations of corruption, media repression, and forced disappearances of students rocked his 
administration and led to international condemnation (Ahmed, 2012). International development 
organizations quickly doubled down on pressuring Mexico to improve its human rights situation, 
at the risk of losing economic and military aid. The US Agency for International Development 
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(USAID) also implemented its “2014-2018 Country Development Cooperation Strategy,” further 
committing Mexico to the improvement of human rights (USAID, 2014).   
International politics aside, the rapid influx of Central American migrants beginning in 2012 
also began to strain Mexican social dynamics. While generally more accepting of diverse 
cultures and immigration than Americans, Mexicans in rural communities slowly became 
skeptical of the migrants populating their cities. Thought to be thieves or liars who attracted 
violence and worked for lower wages, immigrants became synonymous with the economic woes 
of Mexico’s lower, rural classes. The conservative Mexican elite doubled down on advocating 
for stricter immigration laws and better visa regulation for Central American migrants (Shoichet, 
2012).  
 Human rights violations committed against migrants, combined with worsening public 
opinion and the need to cooperate with the US and Canada, motivated Peña Nieto to seek 
solutions to the “crisis” of Central American transit migration. With the precedent for 
US/Mexico security cooperation in place with the Mérida Initiative, and the US more than 
willing to engage on the issue, it was relatively straightforward for Peña Nieto to begin talks on 
what would become PFS.  
 
Conclusion  
 Both the United States and Mexico conceptualized PFS as the solution to a complex set 
of social and political crises that were jeopardizing their countries economically and politically. 
This chapter highlights that, working within the framework provided by the Mérida Initiative, the 
US developed PFS with the objective of slowing the number of migrants reaching its border, 
Mexico developed it with the intention of disincentivizing migrants to leave their countries of 
origin and to better guarantee their human rights if they did so anyway. In “Border Games: 
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Policing the US/Mexico Divide,” Peter Andreas shows that this dichotomy between objectives 
has persisted between the two countries for decades. As Chapter 2 explained, analyzing available 
data, the program in the short-term was much more effective at apprehending migrants and 
UACs and preventing them from reaching the United States than it was at guaranteeing their 
human rights. Chapter 4 takes a deeper look at this assertion, studying the efforts Mexico has 
since taken to disrupt and deter transit migration since 2014. It studies more closely both the US 
and Mexican response to NTCA migrants currently as compared to before and immediately after 
PFS was implemented. It concludes by exploring whether these responses have changed 
significantly and whether PFS may be understood as a point of departure toward a new phase of 
increased US/Mexico security and immigration cooperation.   
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CHAPTER 4 
TOWARD A NORTH AMERICAN IMMIGRATION STRATEGY? 
 
 The previous chapters of this work have surveyed the genesis and immediate effects of 
PFS. As Chapter 2 explained, PFS was far more effective at curbing transit migration than 
protecting the human rights of migrants – a retreat from the Mexican model of immigration 
policy toward Guatemala and a shift toward a more “American” model of immigrant 
apprehension and deportation. Chapter 3 outline both Mexico and the United States’s 
motivations in developing the program. As both countries were experiencing economic and 
political pressure from the influx of Central American migrants, the program represented a rare 
opportunity for immigration policy cooperation between two countries that have historically 
opposed one-another on issues concerning immigration. These chapters help prove that PFS was 
cooperative in nature and represented a significant departure from both countries’ previous 
security and immigration policies. The purpose of this chapter is to extend the investigation into 
the present, taking a qualitative survey of how the migrant journey, Mexican immigrant 
response, and security discourse between Mexico and the US has changed in the years since 
2014. In doing so, it hopes to uncover the degree to which PFS represents a long-term shift in the 
US/Mexico security and immigration relationship toward a greater degree of cooperation. To 
reference the literature, did the US and Mexico work in concert to effectively “externalize” the 
US’s southern border?  
 This chapter analyzes political shifts in the US and Mexico and discusses significant 
changes in Mexico’s response to NTCA transit migrants, including in the administration of work 
visas and asylum applications as well as the physical blockage of migrants at the southern 
border. It finds that the Mexican and US response to NTCA migrants has shifted dramatically 
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since the rollout of PFS, with the US toughening its response to asylum requesters at its southern 
border and Mexico showing increased willingness to cooperate by preventing migrants from 
reaching the northern half of the country. It then discusses the future of this cooperation by 
assessing the viability of a “safe third country” agreement between the two nations using lessons 
learned from Turkey and the EU.  
 
US vs Mexican Responses to Mass Waves of NTCA Migrants Since 2014 
Introduction 
 Any discussion of US and Mexican priority shifts in immigration and security policy 
would be lacking without first discussing the dramatic political changes that both countries 
underwent during their presidential elections in 2016 and 2018. While noticeable upticks in 
security cooperation occurred between PFS’s 2014 announcement and 2016, the election of 
Donald Trump in the US and of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) in Mexico provided the 
impetus for the groundwork laid by PFS to manifest in the heightened cooperation that may be 
observed today. Perhaps the greatest indicator of increased US/Mexico security cooperation in 
the years since PFS is Mexico’s evolving response to mass waves of NTCA migrants from 2014 
through present-day. 
 
Political Shifts in the US and Mexico 
 Trump and AMLO ran very similar presidential campaigns on the opposite ends of the 
political spectrum: Trump on the far-right and AMLO on the left. Very early in his campaign for 
president in 2016, Trump found that anti-immigrant messaging resonated most strongly with the 
voters who would become his electoral base: calls for Mexico to “build the wall” along the US 
southern border became his political rallying cry (Massey, 2015). In the year prior to the US 
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election in November 2016, influxes of Central American migrants arriving along the US 
southern border further galvanized the American far-right behind Trump’s campaign – mass 
media coverage of increased migration and Trump’s dramatic solutions to it helped elevate his 
campaign popularity far beyond projections. There is also considerable evidence that his 
campaign sparked a “migrant rush” along the US/Mexico border – which likely aided his push 
for tougher immigration restrictions in the US if elected (Stargardter & Edwards, 2016). Trump 
won the presidency in November 2016, and immediately set to work hardening the country’s 
immigration policies. Deportations, expedited removals, and policing all increased as access to 
legal representation, ‘catch and release,’4 DACA5, and asylum applications were all scaled down. 
These shifts in policy, while expected, placed increased pressure on Mexican and Central 
American migrants to attempt the journey into the US before it became impossible. Combatting 
increased migration helped shore up support for Trump’s early policies and set the stage for his 
presidency (Stargardter & Edwards, 2016).  
 Trump’s election was significant to US/Mexico relations – namely security and 
immigration cooperation – in a number of ways. Early into his presidency, Trump’s Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson and Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly began frequently visiting 
Mexico’s Peña Nieto to discuss US immigration policy and avenues for increased cross-border 
collaboration (Lin et. al., 2017). Trumps frequent calls upon Mexico to “pay for the wall” also 
helped shift the focus of immigration discourse south to Mexico. The US media and 
policymakers soon began speculating on whether Mexico should play an even larger role in 
restricting transit migration (Lin et. al., 2017). Peña Nieto, embattled by corruption scandals and 
                                                        
 
4 An Obama-era program allowing people apprehended at the US/Mexico border to be released into the US while 
their requests for asylum worked their way through the immigration system. 
5 An Obama-era program that extended work permits and temporary protection to over 750,000 people who were 
brought into the US illegally as children.  
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winding down his final term as president of Mexico, indicated often that cooperation between 
both countries in all areas was of paramount importance. Peña Nieto’s primary goal was to 
defend Mexico against political attacks while maintaining diplomatic relations with the US – 
especially as they related to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which Trump 
frequently criticized (Needham, 2016). However, Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric still played a 
large role in garnering electoral support in Mexico for populist center-left candidate López 
Obrador, whose election in 2018, counterintuitively, was yet another step toward greater 
cooperation between the two countries.  
 AMLO’s landslide victory in July 2018 represented a massive social shift in the country 
and upended the country’s political establishment – the PRI party – which had maintained 
relative power in the country since 1929. AMLO’s campaign promised to end government 
corruption, reduce gang and drug violence, and address poverty and inequality. It was a dramatic 
step away from the “Peña Nieto model” which focused much more on international engagement 
and economic development. AMLO’s populist, “Mexico-first” campaign was largely similar to 
Trump’s, but on opposite ends of the political spectrum. Very early, he positioned himself in 
opposition to the US administration, firing back against attacks over immigration and crime in 
the country. His election carried great significance for US/Mexico relations, and many expected 
him to immediately set to work taking a less conciliatory line with the US than his counterpart. 
However, AMLO’s stance toward Central American migrants, which he articulated early in his 
campaign, was to disincentivize migration and provide greater opportunities and humanitarian 
protection to those in transit. This model carried the precedent set PFS and directly served the 
US’s agenda to harden its border and prevent migration entirely. This opportunity for increased 
cooperation was not lost on Trump, who tweeted “…There is much to be done that will benefit 
both the United States and Mexico!” on the eve of AMLO’s election (Ahmed & Villegas, 2018).  
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 Trump and AMLO’s elections increased both countries’ incentive to collaborate on the 
issue of Central American transit migration even more extensively than previous administrations. 
Trump needed to decrease the rate of migrants arriving at the US southern border, increase 
apprehensions and deportations, and grant asylum to less migrants in order to appease his base. 
Conversely, AMLO promised to protect migrants and offer them increased access to 
humanitarian and temporary work visas to stimulate the economy throughout Mexico’s southern 
states, while increasing development investment in Central America (O’Neil, 2018). The US 
quickly moved to pressure AMLO to enact these policies. In April 2019, Trump criticized 
AMLO for not fully helping “stop the flow of illegal immigrants to our country.” Mexico’s 
Foreign Secretary, Luis Videgaray responded “Every day Mexico and the US work together on 
migration throughout the region,” (Linthicum, 2018). While inaccurate, the Tweet – along with 
others very similar to it – indicate that the Trump administration expected Mexico to play an 
increased role in expanding the policies set in motion by PFS in 2014 – a meaningful departure 
from the discourse that dominated immigration relations prior. The following section evaluates 
Mexico’s interactions with NTCA “migrant caravans” and compares them to those prior to PFS. 
It explores how Mexico worked in concert with the US and further embraced its role in 
disincentivizing NTCA transit migrants from transiting through the country and reaching the US 
southern border 
 
Mexico and the US’s Evolving Immigration Posture and Increases in Cooperation 
 As discussed, Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala has historically remained very 
porous. NTCA migrants could pass easily into the country, and their earliest priority was 
boarding the La Bestia train north through Mexico before being taken to the United States. 
Today, immigration enforcement in Mexico’s southern region is very different. One of Mexico’s 
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earliest priorities following the implementation of PFS was to prevent transit via train. It placed 
checkpoints along the railroad and subsidized rail company owners to hire private security to 
prevent NTCA migrants from riding aboard their cargo through the country (Vega, 2016). Under 
PFS, Mexico also implemented vehicle immigration checkpoints at large southern ports of entry 
and along major highways linking southern states to the core of the country. While this 
escalation appears to have been effective in the short term – as evidenced by the large spike in 
apprehensions of Central Americans by Mexican immigration agents in 2014 and 2015 – some 
analysts argue that it did little to disincentivize NTCA transit migration. Instead, it may have 
only pushed migrants off of known transit routes and made the journey through Mexico much 
more dangerous (Montes, 2019).  
 Beginning in October 2018, large groups of NTCA migrants, most from Honduras, began 
traveling through Mexico in groups numbering in the thousands in search of asylum and work in 
the US. The groups, deemed “caravans” by US media, were comprised primarily of women and 
children – “family units” - fleeing structural and social violence in their home countries.6 
Quickly, the “caravans” became a referendum on the US/Mexico immigration relationship, with 
both countries expecting the other to meet normative obligations that developed in the years 
following PFS (Semple, 2018). While initial groups were met with ambivalence and even 
applause from Mexicans as they passed from Guatemala into Mexico, the Mexican government 
quickly mobilized to intercept larger groups as they gathered in Central America and prepared to 
make the journey north. In what was called a “radical change in Mexican foreign policy,” 
AMLO routed hundreds of federal police to the southern border to intercept and physically block 
future “caravans” from entering the country without documentation. In weeks, with praise from 
                                                        
 
6 “Caravan” is used in quotations throughout this work because it’s implications as a signifier for large groups of 
NTCA migrants remains disputed.  
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the Trump administration, Mexico’s quiet southern border began to resemble that of the US, with 
federal police blocking migrants using riot shields and forcing them to wait in lines miles long 
while asylum applications were received and processed. Migrants quickly sought alternate routes 
and entered Mexico by crossing rivers or through countryside and continuing their journey north 
(Agren, 2018). A clear tension emerged within the AMLO administration between extending 
protections to migrant groups and apprehending and deporting them. After cutting budgets for 
Mexico’s federal migration and asylum agencies, reports emerged that he had grown fatigued by 
mass NTCA migration and US pressure and was considering “bottling up” migrants in the 
southern part of the country (Averbuch & Sheridan, 2019). It became clear that AMLO’s 
priorities were much more aligned with the US’s than some expected. As “caravans” continued 
through the country and began reaching the US, AMLO escalated Mexico’s response using 
avenues created by PFS.  
 When enacted in 2014, PFS expanded the distribution of work visas to Central 
American’s in an effort to disincentivize transit migration through the country and stimulate the 
economy in Mexico’s southern states (Vega, 2016). While this policy has fluctuated in the years 
since PFS, AMLO’s policy on migrant “caravans” became an embrace and extension of it. In 
January 2019, in an effort to keep a group of over 12,000 migrants in Mexico, AMLO 
substantially sped up the process for procuring a yearlong humanitarian visa that allows migrants 
to travel and work in Mexico legally. The process was shortened from one month to only five 
days (Ernst & Semple, 2019). The policy was later suspended after receiving over 13,000 
applications. However, authorities replaced it by issuing temporary regional visas that restrict 
migrants to the south of the country, thereby allowing them to stay in Mexico while preventing 
them from traveling legally to the US border (Villegas & Semple, 2019).  
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 As Mexico developed policies and reordered priorities in an attempt to prevent mass 
transit migration and entice migrants to remain in the southern half of the country, the Trump 
administration concurrently worked to disincentivize migration through Mexico by hardening the 
US’s southern border. Amid increased rates of NTCA migrants presenting themselves at ports of 
entry to request asylum, the administration doubled down on deterrence measures. In April 2018, 
he deployed the US National Guard to the border, declaring an “emergency” and pressuring 
Congress to allocate funding for the construction of a border wall. Through 2018, Trump’s 
Homeland Security department continued to harden the border while engaging heavily with 
Mexico to prevent further migration (Shear & Perlroth, 2018). Family separation policies, 
preventing migrants from accessing ports of entry, and confrontations between border patrol 
officers and migrants led to public outrage, further incentivizing the US to seek new avenues for 
cooperation with Mexico. In November 2018, Trump tweeted that Mexico “should move the flag 
waving Migrants… back to their countries. … they are NOT coming into the U.S.A.,” (Oprysko, 
2018). Soon thereafter, violence along the border escalated, resulting in one of the US’s largest 
ports of entry being completely shut down for one day. In spite of Trump’s abrasive approach to 
diplomacy, Mexico’s Interior Ministry vowed to increase security along the Mexico side of the 
border, a fascinating departure from Mexico’s previous posture.  
 Perhaps the most stunning instance of immigration cooperation between the US and 
Mexican administration during heightened NTCA migration through 2018 was a deal between 
the two countries that kept migrants in Mexican border cities while their asylum claims in the US 
were processed. Announced in December and called the “migration protection protocols,” or 
MPP, the program aimed to prevent abuse of the US “catch and release” system, in which 
asylum seekers were allowed to remain in the US freely while they underwent the asylum 
application process (Zaveri, 2019). Since the 1980 Refugee Act, the US has prohibited the 
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deportation of individuals who are likely to face persecution in their home countries. Asylum 
seekers have always remained in the states while their requests were processed. While Mexico 
was less-than-enthusiastic to hold asylum seekers, its Foreign Ministry said it was “trying to 
respond to US policy,” while “making a sovereign decision… with very clear limits based on 
what our laws and international commitments allow,” (Ahmed et. al., 2019). The MPP was 
unprecedented, and human rights groups were quick to point out the dangers faced by migrants 
held in violent border towns with minimal resources or legal protections (Cheng, 2019). It was 
speculated that holding asylum seekers in areas where they were likely to experience violence 
and extortion may have been another method of migration deterrence for both countries (Ahmed 
et. al., 2019).  
  
Conclusion 
 Between PFS’s announcement in 2014 and current-day, both Mexico and the United 
States have taken substantial steps to enforce immigration policies and deter NTCA migration in 
mutually-beneficial ways. Mexico, most notably, has expanded both interior immigration 
enforcement and visa allocation under the AMLO administration. The US Trump administration 
has taken measures to restrict immigration and disincentivize NTCA migrants from making the 
journey north. Both countries are working in concert much more readily than they were in 2014, 
in spite of the fact that their presidents are on opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. 
Considering the nature of NTCA mass migration in 2014 and the resulting political crises that 
motivated the creation of PFS, it becomes obvious that US/Mexico immigration cooperation has 
widened since the creation of the program. Drawing from the literature and comparative case 
studies, the next section briefly discusses the implications of expanded immigration cooperation 
between the US and Mexico. 
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Discussing the Implications of Increased US/Mexico Cooperation After PFS 
Introduction 
 Increased immigration cooperation between the US and Mexico under the umbrella of 
PFS raises a number of questions about the future of the relationship shared by the neighboring 
countries. Namely, Mexico agreeing to hold US asylum applicants on its side of the border for 
the first time represents a remarkable step toward cooperation in spite of the countries’ stark 
political differences. Since negotiating this agreement with Mexico, the Trump administration 
has doubled down on its efforts to convince Mexican officials to sign a “safe third country” 
agreement with the United States, which would force NTCA migrants to apply for asylum in 
Mexico before they reached the United States, enabling the US to turn them around at the border 
(Krauze, 2019). While the US has floated a safe third country before, the current climate of 
expanded cooperation in the wake of PFS offers the debate legitimacy that it has not previously 
enjoyed. This purpose of this section is to explore the literature on the Turkey/EU relationship, 
which may offer a useful analytical comparison to the US and Mexico. It then assesses the 
viability of a US/Mexico safe third country agreement and discusses the future of North 
American immigration cooperation. 
 
A Safe Third Country? 
 The safe third country agreement (STCA), more formally known as a “country of first 
asylum agreement,” is one of the largest expressions of international cooperation among states in 
the field of immigration and refugee issues (Gil-Bazo, 2015). Put simply, under a safe third 
country agreement, refugees are required to request asylum in the first safe member country they 
arrive in. Proponents of STCAs argue that they prevent “queue-jumping” among refugees and 
prevents overloading a single country’s refugee management infrastructure. However, critics 
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posit that STCAs are essentially only used by wealthy western states to justify denying legitimate 
asylum claims and turn back refugees at their borders. The principle of the STCA agreement 
rests on the promise that all signatories can rely on one-another to provide reasonable protection 
for refugees within their borders. As the definition of “safe,” is readily debated in academic and 
humanitarian spaces, STCA agreements across the world have fallen under scrutiny for forcing 
refugees to apply for asylum in countries that may endanger them (Christophersen, 2016). An 
STCA agreement between the US and Mexico would therefore represent a massive policy step 
toward greater immigration and security cooperation.  
Analyzing an existing STCA agreement similar to the one that would exist between the 
US and Mexico may be useful in assessing its viability. It is likely that a US/Mexico STCA deal 
would closely resemble that between the EU and Turkey. In March 2016, Turkey and the EU 
agreed to the “EU-Turkey Deal:” a statement of cooperation aimed at reducing the number of 
irregular Syrian migrants arriving in Greece via the Mediterranean Sea and seeking asylum in the 
EU, of which Turkey is not a member. Instead of processing asylum applications, Greece would 
instead reroute refugees to Turkey, which was at the time already hosting over 3 million refugees 
itself. In exchange, Turkey was offered €3 billion to improve refugee human rights and 
processing infrastructure (Long, 2018). Turkey has long attempted to negotiate EU membership; 
the deal also promised to revive these negotiations. Soon after the deal was struck, however, it 
came under intense scrutiny from international human rights NGOs, which argued that Turkey 
failed to provide adequate protections for refugees within its borders (MSF, 2019). Since the 
deal, violence in Turkey and geopolitics have negatively affected the legitimacy of the deal and 
moved Turkey away from the EU. However, as the European Parliament writes, the program was 
a result of years of negotiation and was “dedicated to deepening Turkey-EU relations as well as 
to strengthening their cooperation on the migration crisis,” (Perchoc, 2019).  
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Exploring the possibility of a US/Mexico STCA agreement provides a useful metric to 
gauge “where the countries are” in terms of immigration and security cooperation. While 
unlikely, if the US and Mexico were to enter an STCA agreement, the EU/Turkey model may be 
used to predict its trajectory as Mexico and Turkey share a number of similarities. Chief among 
them, however, is that they are both extremely popular transit countries for irregular migrants 
and they both suffer from corruption, impunity, and human rights issues that jeopardize their 
viability as potential “safe” destinations for refugees (Leutert, 2018). As discussed, the migrant 
journey through Mexico is one of the most dangerous in the world. Any STCA agreement would 
have to double down on PFS’s failed efforts to protect the human rights of migrants once they 
enter Mexico. For this reason, American academics and Mexican politicians have come out 
against both the MPP and a potential STCA deal. While an agreement will probably not be 
reached soon, the MPP is an early indicator that both countries are willing to entertain 
cooperative policies that mimic the STCA and work to further “externalize” the US’s border 
policy to Mexico.   
 
Conclusion 
 In the years since PFS was announced in 2014, both the US and Mexico have taken 
unprecedented and significant steps to deter NTCA transit migration to the US by reinforcing 
Mexico’s southern border, expanding and streamlining Mexican work visa and asylum 
provisions, and hardening the immigration enforcement infrastructure of both countries. The 
most unique instance of cooperation is Mexico’s MPP agreement to hold NTCA refugees on 
their side of the border while they request asylum in the United States. This new policy, 
combined with overt pressure from the Trump administration, brings both countries even closer 
to an STCA agreement despite concerns on both sides of the border.  
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 While some analysts refer to Mexico’s recent immigration policy evolution as a “radical 
shift in foreign policy,” this characterization is inaccurate. Both the US and Mexico began 
working in mutually beneficial ways immediately following the enactment of PFS, and 
contemporary instances of immigration cooperation would not be possible without the bedrock 
for that PFS provided in 2014. While an STCA agreement is unlikely anytime soon, the fact that 
it has become a centerpiece of the US/Mexico NTCA migration question is remarkable.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
PFS should be understood as the point of departure for the widening of US/Mexican 
immigration cooperation observed today. Through 2014, the sheer number of irregular NTCA 
migrants transiting through Mexico to the United States demanded the development of a cross-
border strategy. PFS was a unique departure from Mexico’s previous security and immigration 
policies because it represented a new standard of bilateral cooperation with the United States on 
immigration policy whereas cooperation had usually only occurred on security and counter-
narcotics strategies. PFS succeeded in enforcing apprehension and deportation policies but failed 
to better guarantee the human rights of Central American migrants as they transited through 
Mexico. In the years since PFS was announced, Mexican and US response to NTCA migrants 
has shifted dramatically, with the US toughening its response to asylum requesters at its southern 
border and Mexico showing increased willingness to cooperate by preventing migrants from 
reaching the northern half of the country. In spite of an expanding ideological chasm between the 
Trump and AMLO administrations, both continue to seek mutually beneficial avenues for 
preventing irregular NTCA migration. With little recognition from academics and policymakers, 
PFS’s quiet implementation fundamentally altered the US/Mexican immigration dynamic and 
brought both countries closer to a “North American immigration strategy.”   
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